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ABSTRACT 
Following the genealogical work of Foucault, Rose and others, this thesis aimed 
to trace the conditions of possibility for re-feeding to emerge and continue as a 
primary treatment regimen for self-starving individuals.   This focus was in 
relation to the known poor long-term outcomes – an approximately fifty per cent 
recovery rate - for people who come into contact with services and are diagnosed 
with anorexia nervosa.  Historical and present case narratives, which captured re-
feeding practices in 1960s and 2000s, were presented and analysed using the 
genealogical research strategies of ‘surface of emergence’ and ‘descent’ in 
relation to five perspectival dimensions, namely strategies, authorities, 
technologies, subjectivities and problematizations.  Re-feeding emerged in 
relation to neo-hygienic strategies for public health for preventative and 
individualised medicine, and the reconfigured authority of psychiatry as a ‘mental 
medicine’, which had new physical technologies such as modified insulin therapy 
and psychopharmacological treatments, to shape the conduct and bodies of self-
starving individuals in accordance with the ‘norms’ of health. Increasingly, re-
feeding practices have become imbricated within strategies for the ‘administration 
of risk’ as self-starving individuals have become problematized in terms of the 
degree of AN or level of risk they pose.  Overtime re-feeding as a life-saving 
measure, and self-starvation as a ‘mental disorder’, has become ‘black boxed’ in 
relation to bio-political strategies for administering risk within the context of rights, 
choice and empowerment, and a culture of blame and sanctions.  Implications for 
research and clinical practice are discussed.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this section I introduce the reader to the focus of this study, issues of 
definitions, my position as a researcher and the aims of this research.   
1.1. Introduction to the study 
Self-starving individuals who actively refuse to gain weight and come to the 
attention of mental health services are likely to be diagnosed with ‘anorexia 
nervosa’1 [AN], which is said to refer to a psychiatric syndrome (Russell, 1970) 
characterised by self-induced low body weight, a fear of fatness or weight gain, a 
distorted body image and amenorrhea (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2000). 
Early accounts assumed that self-starvation was a consequence of a “morbid 
mental state” and recommended that “patients should be fed at regular intervals” 
(Gull, 1874, cited in Dally & Sargant, 1960, p. 1770).  Aside from the decades in 
the early-to-mid-twentieth century during which weight loss was conceptualised 
as a hormonal condition requiring hormonal treatment (discussed in section 3.2), 
re-feeding, with the objective of weight restoration and return of regular menses, 
has been a dominant treatment regimen for self-starving individuals, exemplified 
in the following quotes: 
The treatments of patients with anorexia nervosa can be subdivided 
into two phases: 
1. The initial treatment aimed at saving life, restoring nutrition 
and relieving acute psychiatric disturbance. 
2. The long-term treatment where the aims should be the 
consolidation of the patient’s improvement, and the 
prevention of relapses which are only too common. 
 (Russell, 1970, p. 151) 
                                            
1
 ‘Anorexia nervosa’ and ‘AN’ are used interchangeably with self-starving individuals. For ease of reading 
inverted commas will not be used after this point but it should be noted that the label is not used 
uncritically. 
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Treatment goals in AN include stabilisation of medical and 
nutritional status (restoration of weight and normal menstrual 
cycles), re-establishment of healthy patterns of eating (including 
cessation of restriction and purging), improvement of body image 
and amelioration of the morbid pre-occupation with weight and 
shape.  
(Claudino, de Lima, Hay, Bacaltchuk, Schmidt & Treasure, 2006, p. 4) 
The success of re-feeding practices and concomitant interventions to “cure” AN, 
however, have been and continue to be limited: 
During the first phase, treatment is relatively simple and successful 
results are easily obtained so long as a few elementary principles 
are adhered to.  It is easy to induce a very considerable weight gain 
in wasted patients.  The long-term treatment is much more difficult 
and the outcome is often unpredictable. 
     (Russell, 1970, p. 151) 
The treatment of AN is frequently longterm and challenging. 
Prognostic studies have shown that AN is often a chronic illness, 
with only half of the patients achieving full recovery in long-term 
follow-up studies. 
(Claudino et al., 2006, p. 4) 
Despite an estimated fifty per cent ‘recovery’2 rate (Claudino et al., 2006; 
Steinhausen, 2002), re-feeding continues to be recommended as a primary 
intervention for people diagnosed with AN (NICE, 2004).  As the more recent 
quote illustrates, patients who do not respond to this treatment have become 
conceptualised as having a ‘chronic’ and incurable form of anorexia. 
Curious about the continued use of re-feeding practices in spite of its limited 
effectiveness, I decided to explore re-feeding practices from a different theoretical 
                                            
2
 In this context, ‘recovery’ or a ‘good outcome’ refers to the ‘normalization’ of weight, 
menstruation and eating behaviour (Steinhausen, 2002). 
3 
 
framework.  The different framework, a Foucauldian genealogical approach, 
problematizes present practices by employing a theoretical-analytical framework 
to historicise the present.  A Foucauldian genealogical approach historicises the 
present by examining the conditions that made it possible for practices and 
subjectivities to emerge and by tracing the complex course of events between the 
period of emergence and present day that enable particular practices and 
subjectivities to continue.  The aim of this approach is to disturb what was 
formerly immobile (Foucault, 1977b).   
1.2. Issues of Definition 
I will briefly deconstruct the title of this thesis; A genealogical exploration of the 
conditions of possibility for re-feeding to emerge as a treatment regime.   The first 
part of the title refers to the use of a theoretical-analytical approach – genealogy 
– employed by Foucault in works such as Discipline and Punish (1977a) and The 
History of Sexuality Vol. 1 (1979b).  This approach has continued to be used and 
developed by Rose (1985; 1999), Butler (1990), Ussher (1996; 2011), Malson 
(1998) and others in relation to critiques of the practices and knowledge of the 
‘psy’ disciplines.  The verb emerge draws attention to the fact that re-feeding as a 
practice came into being in relation to the conditions of possibility – the network 
of macro and micro social, cultural and political contexts and events (Foucault, 
1977b). 
In the current study, re-feeding refers to practices that focus on weight gain.  As 
described above the individuals who are the target of these practices are those 
who refuse to maintain a ‘normal’ body weight and who, following assessment 
within mental health services, are given a diagnosis of AN.  Finally, treatment 
regimen draws attention to the legitimacy, or authority and expertise, of 
psychological, medical and legal discursive practices in relation to the 
management and treatment of self-starving individuals.  
1.3. Researcher’s position 
In this section I explicitly acknowledge “the personal and political values and 
perspective informing” this thesis (Burr, 2003, p. 157).    
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As a trainee clinical psychologist, on a course which adopts a critical approach to 
the training of psychologists and the ‘psy’ professions (Harper, Patel, Davidson & 
Byrne, 2007), I have been challenged to look beyond what appear to be givens 
about people, diagnoses and clinical practice.  I have become increasingly 
interested in “how we know what we know?” and how some constructs and 
practices continue to be privileged despite vigorous analysis and criticism (e.g., 
Bentall, 2003; Boyle, 2002; Harper, 1996; Rapley, 2004).    A lecture on the 
assessment and treatment of eating disorders, in my first year of training, 
included a vignette of a woman who had been admitted to hospital on multiple 
occasions because her weight was ‘dangerously low’.  Each time she was 
admitted her weight was restored to an acceptable level and each time after 
returning home she lost the gained weight.   I wondered whether the ‘treatment’ 
might have played a role in her becoming a ‘chronic anorexic’ and a ‘revolving 
door patient’.  I found it difficult, however, in this lecture, and in other lectures, to 
question knowledge and clinical practice, as though by asking these questions I 
was questioning the obvious and putting myself in opposition to my discipline and 
colleagues. 
My own experiences have led me to wonder whether there is space to discuss 
anything other than what is ‘known’ in relation to re-feeding and other clinical 
practices.  For example, my reading has highlighted that approaches outside of 
the dominant discourses, such as social constructionist accounts of AN and 
treatment, have been criticised for being purely academic enterprises (e.g., 
Holmes, 2001). 
I have become increasingly curious as to why some forms of knowledge or 
discourses, for example, psychological and psychiatric discourses associated 
with positivist methods of research, which prioritise bio-psycho explanations and 
interventions, continue to be dominant in clinical practice in spite of their failing 
“capacity to cure” (Rose, 1996b, p. 3).  I have come to identify as a critical 
feminist psychologist. 
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1.4. Aims of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to problematize the practice of re-feeding as the 
primary treatment for self-starving individuals.  The primary aim of problematizing 
re-feeding is to de-stabilise taken-for-granted truths about the necessity of this 
approach, which silences questions or other perspectives, and prevents other 
approaches or conceptualisations from emerging.  The secondary aim is to draw 
attention to the practice in the context of the ‘psy’ disciplines and how they are 
intertwined with power and the ways we have come to know and act on others 
and ourselves through technologies of power and technologies of the self 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; Tamboukou, 2003). 
These aims are based upon the conclusion that only half of the people who come 
into contact with mental health services and diagnosed with AN make a good or 
satisfactory recovery (Claudino et al., 2006; Steinhausen, 2002).  In 
problematizing clinical practice, it is hoped that it will open up space for new ways 
of thinking about how we interact and intervene with self-starving individuals.   
In sections 1.1 to 1.4 I have set the scene for this thesis by introducing the focus 
and aims, my position as a researcher and the methodological approach.  A 
review of the literature follows. 
1.5. Chapter Overview 
In the following sections I define the literature included, review the micro and 
macro discourses and discursive practices relating to re-feeding and state the 
justification for this research.    
1.6. Defining the Literature 
A search of the literature3 yielded a total of 28,202 results for anorexia nervosa 
and 2,051 results for re-feeding and anorexia nervosa.  Notably, the majority of 
the literature relating to anorexia (66.1%) and re-feeding and anorexia (71.16%) 
had been published between 2000 and 2013. 
                                            
3
 See appendix A for the details of the databases searched and search terms employed. 
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Limiting the search for the current review, I focused on particular practices and 
knowledges that have been associated with re-feeding. These included recovery, 
compulsory treatment, mortality rates and chronic anorexia.  Appendix B 
summarises the parameters of the search.   
Congruent with a feminist and critical thesis and the theoretical-analytic 
framework informing this research, I have not limited the review to the above 
literature, which could in the main be described as being based upon ontological 
and epistemological assumptions of “empiricist notions of objectivity” (Malson & 
Ussher, 1997, p. 47).  Published research relating to less dominant discourses 
(e.g. informed by post-structuralist, post-modernist, critical and feminist 
epistemological frameworks) has also been reviewed. 
1.7. Self-starving Women 
Self-starving women4, the focus of re-feeding practices, have been problematized 
as ‘having’ anorexia, a ‘mental disorder’5, illustrated in the quote below:  
Anorexia nervosa is a syndrome in which the individual maintains a 
low weight as a result of a pre-occupation with body weight, 
construed either as a fear of fatness or pursuit of thinness. (…)  
(National Institute for Clinical Excellence [NICE], 2004, p. 13) 
Physicians Charles Lasèque and William Gull have been credited with producing 
the earliest medical descriptions of l’anorexie hystérique and anorexia nervosa in 
1873 and 1874, respectively.  Both physicians published accounts of severe 
emaciation and amenorrhea in the absence of known physical causes (Russell, 
1995). 
Over the last 30 years there has been increasing diversity within the literature in 
relation to practices of self-starvation; for example, maintaining a low weight in 
relation to social-cultural practices such as the thin ideal and the dieting industry 
                                            
4
 Diagnoses of anorexia nervosa have overwhelmingly been applied to females (Ben-Tovim & 
Morton, 1990; Gans & Gunn, 2003; Hsu, 1989; Malson, 1998).   
5
 ‘Mental disorders’ is a problematic term but for ease of reading I have not used inverted commas 
after this point. 
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(Garner & Garfinkel, 1980; Silverstein, Peterson & Perdue, 1986; Hsu, 1989), a 
rejection of female roles or the consequence of lack of a positive female identity 
(Irigaray, 1988, cited in Malson & Ussher, 1997) and AN as an object of 
discourse and not a reified disease (Hepworth, 1999).   Medical or “quasi-
medical” frameworks, in which anorexia is conceptualised as a “’real’ 
individualized clinical” entity, however, continue to dominate (Malson, Finn, 
Treasure, Clarke & Anderson, 2004, p. 474).   
Self-starvation, however, has not always been conceptualised as an 
individualized clinical entity.  Hepworth (1999) and Malson (1998) have 
highlighted how historical accounts of self-starvation during medieval Europe 
portrayed fasting as a saintly or religious act, for example, “Cristina the 
Astonishing (…) gave up food because she had nothing else to give up for Christ” 
(cited in Malson, 1998, p. 50).  The shift from religious to medical explanations for 
fasting was not clear cut but the “ascendency of the medical profession” marked 
a discontinuity between theological conceptualisations and ‘scientific’ medical 
explanations (Malson, 1998, p. 51).   
AN has become firmly entrenched, or ‘black boxed’, within Western society and 
although knowledge of its aetiology is not known and treatment continues to be 
ineffective for large numbers, the body of research related to anorexia, for 
example, risk factors for chronicity, physical complications, mortality statistics, 
has grown exponentially. 
In this section I have described dominant conceptualisations of starvation as a 
mental disorder and in the section below I discuss how this positions re-feeding 
as the obvious treatment regime. 
1.8. Re-feeding Starving Women 
Treatment approaches have, inevitably, been shaped by ways in 
which eating distress, body dissatisfaction and associated body-
management practices are understood. 
(Malson et al., 2004, p. 474) 
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Self-starvation conceptualised as a mental disorder marked by symptoms of low 
body weight, intense fear of weight gain, distorted body image or denial of the 
seriousness of low body weight and amenorrhea, leads on to treatment regimes 
that increase body weight, establish healthy patterns of eating, improve 
perception of the body and restore normal menstrual cycles.  The NICE 
guidelines, while recognising the absence of conclusive evidence to support 
treatments used for people diagnosed with AN, identified the following three key 
priorities for intervention: 
 Most adults with anorexia nervosa should be managed on an 
outpatient basis with psychological treatment provided by a 
service that is competent in giving that treatment and 
assessing the physical risk of people with eating disorders. 
 People with anorexia nervosa requiring inpatient treatment 
should normally be admitted to a setting that can provide the 
skilled implementation of refeeding with careful physical 
monitoring (particularly in the first few days of refeeding) and 
in combination with psychosocial interventions. 
 Family interventions that directly address the eating disorder 
should be offered to children and adolescents with anorexia 
nervosa. 
(NICE, 2004, p. 60) 
Unsurprisingly, all three recommendations centre on physical and psychological 
symptoms associated with anorexia.  For the outpatient accessing psychological 
therapy, which targets the perceptual distortions and resistance to eating and 
weight gain, or relational therapies, such as interpersonal therapy, cognitive 
analytic therapy or family therapy, weight maintenance or weight gain remains 
the primary goal.  Increasing weight loss, which puts the individual at ‘high risk’, 
leads to stepped-up care in a day programme or in-patient unit (NICE, 2004; 
Royal College of Psychiatrists [RCP], 2010).   
Following on from the inevitability of clinical conceptualisations of self-starvation 
shaping clinical responses, in the following section I consider evidence informing 
the ‘high risk’ discourse of AN.  
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1.9. Self-starving Oneself to Death 
Within the anorexia literature, mortality is repeatedly highlighted with claims that it 
is the most lethal of all mental disorders (e.g., Guarda, 2008; Hoek, 2006; Harris 
& Barraclough, 1988; NICE, 2004; Ramsay, Ward, Treasure & Russell, 1999; 
Robinson, 2012).  The actual number of people who die each year from AN in 
developed countries, however, is unclear. 
A standardised mortality ratio [SMR]6 of 5.9, which suggests that people 
diagnosed with AN have almost a six-fold increase of premature death in 
comparison to the rest of the population, is frequently cited to illustrate the 
lethality of AN.  This figure of 5.9 was based on a review of published research 
since the 1950s by Steinhausen (2002).  Reported mortality statistics, based on 
SMRs, however, have ranged from 0.0 (Wentz, Gillberg, Anckarsäter, Gillber & 
Råstam, 2009) to 23.14 (Agras, Crow, Halmi & Byson, 2009). 
The variability in mortality rates have been attributed to differences in research 
design, diagnostic criteria used (Arcelus, Mitchell, Wales & Nielsen, 2011), 
method of treatment (Keel et al., 2003) and length of follow-up (Arcelus et al., 
2011).  It has also been suggested that higher mortality rates could be in relation 
to the assumption that all premature deaths have resulted from AN (Arcelus et al. 
2011).   
Papers published between 2000 and 2013, which reported causes of death7, 
included deaths associated with AN (e.g. suicide and physical complications) and 
deaths unrelated to AN (e.g. passenger in a car accident, homicide, other health 
conditions) in their estimated mortality ratios.  Interestingly the deaths associated 
with AN did not result from inanition or associated physical complications alone.  
Fatal outcomes associated with AN were reportedly related to complications of 
malnutrition and alcohol use (Birmingham, Su, Hlynsky, Goldner & Gao, 2005; 
Button, Chadalavada & Palmer, 2010; Herzog et al., 2000; Keel et al., 2003; 
                                            
6
 Two different calculations have been used to report mortality rates: the crude mortality rate 
[CMR] and the SMR.  The CMR simply refers to the percentage of deaths within the study 
population (Van Hoeken, Seidell & Hoek, 2003) whereas the SMR involves assumptions about 
the sample and broader population in order to calculate “the ratio of observed to expected deaths” 
(Arcelus et al., 2011, p. 725).    
7
 A table listing the papers and causes of death can be found in appendix C. 
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Rosling, Sparén, Norring & von Knorring, 2011), binging and purging behaviours 
(Herzog et al., 2000; Keel et al., 2003;  Löwe et al., 2001; Rosling et al., 2011) 
and suicide (Birmingham et al., 2005; Button et al., 2010; Crow et al., 2009 ; 
Herzog et al., 2000; Hjern, Lindberg & Lindblad, 2006; Huas et al., 2011; Keel et 
al., 2003; Papadopoulos, Ekbo, Brandt & Ekselius, 2009; Rosling et al., 2011).   
In contrast to cohort studies, prevalence studies have reported much lower 
incidences of mortality.  For example, an audit of death certificates in England 
and Wales between 1993 and 1999 identified 140 deaths associated with AN, 
which equated to less than 20 deaths per year from a population of 52 million 
people (Muir & Palmer, 2004).  A North American study reported an average of 
145 deaths per year for the entire US (Hewitt, Coren & Steel, 2001).  Similarly, 
Hjern, Lindberg and Lindbald (2006) reported a point prevalence of 1.51 per 
100,000 (0.0000151%) among a total population cohort of Swedish females born 
between 1968 and 1977.  Commenting on the disparity between mortality rates in 
prevalence and cohort studies, Muir and Palmer (2004) suggested that audits of 
death certificates have probably underreported the number of deaths associated 
with AN because suicides and physical complications were not reported.  They 
also argued, however, that there was probably “a serious over-reporting” of 
deaths associated with AN in follow-up research (p. 359).  
Despite the methodological limitations and variability of research reporting 
mortality statistics and the complexity of the relationship between food refusal, 
self-starvation and other behaviours which might be associated with high levels of 
distress, mortality rates have been frequently employed “as an indicator of the 
severity of anorexia” (Hoek, 2006, p. 389).  Re-feeding is predicated on the belief 
that not restoring weight puts the individual’s life at great risk (RCP, 2010). 
I have briefly problematized mortality statistics and suggested that they lead on to 
re-feeding practices in order to save lives.  In the next section, I briefly describe 
how discourses of death and risk are employed as a rationale for the compulsory 
re-feeding of self-starving individuals.  
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1.10. Re-feeding Self-Starving Women who Refuse to be Re-fed 
Resistance or ambivalence towards re-feeding practices is common among self-
starving individuals.  It has been suggested that this is because of the ‘ego-
syntonic’ nature of AN (Halmi, 2011).   
Even when a patient’s health deteriorates to the degree where 
death is imminent, she may refuse treatment.  If she refuses 
treatment, her treaters and family must decide whether to override 
her refusal, disrespect her autonomy, and risk the therapeutic 
alliance even without a guarantee that treatment will be effective, or 
respect her wish and risk her death.  Or, weighing the conditions, 
they may override her refusal and reverse the effects of starvation, 
save her life, and launch her on the road to recovery.  
(Gans & Gunn, 2003, p. 677). 
Gans and Gunn (2003) have acknowledged that the treatment might not be 
effective but draw on the discourse of risk for re-feeding to be used as a ‘life-
saving measure’.  It is argued that the death rate would “undoubtedly be higher” if 
compulsory re-feeding was not used for self-starving individuals with a 
“dangerously low” body weight (Draper, 2000, p. 121).  ‘Risk of death’ enables 
mental health professionals to use or threaten involuntary treatment under 
section 3 of the Mental Health Act (MHA) (2007), which authorises the detention 
and re-feeding of self-starving individuals without consent (RCP, 2010) if their 
“health is seriously threatened by food refusal” (Care Quality Commission, 2011, 
p. 6).   
Ninety per cent of 686 senior psychiatrists surveyed in the UK agreed that the 
MHA should be used to enforce compulsory re-feedings.  Eighty per cent rated 
the ‘risk of death’ as the most important reason for employing the act (Tan, Doll, 
Fitzpatrick, Stewart & Hope, 2008).  Psychiatric patients may acquiesce to 
treatment and be recorded as ‘voluntary’ of ‘informal’ “for social administrative 
purposes” (Vassilev & Pilgrim, 2007, p. 352).  It has been suggested that for self-
starving individuals, where figures for compulsory treatment are ‘relatively low’, 
this is frequently the case (Tan, Stewart, Fitzpatrick & Hope, 2010).   
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Compulsory treatment, however, is divisive as some argue that that it is 
superficially effective while alienating patients as they “eat their way out” (e.g. 
Bruch, 2001).  Others, argued that AN impairs the capacity to make judgments 
and choices and “that their views often change after they have received care” 
(e.g. Guarda et al. 2007, p. 109).  The clinical effectiveness of compulsory 
treatment is not known and, it has been suggested, cannot be known because it 
would be unethical to not intervene (Tan, Hope & Stewart, 2003).  Ramsay et al. 
(1999) compared the outcomes for 82 compulsory patients with 81 voluntary 
patients.  They reported increased mortality among the compulsory group (10 
deaths) in comparison to the voluntary group (2 deaths).  They stressed, 
however, that the increased mortality did not reflect on the effectiveness of 
compulsory treatment but could most probably associated with severity, 
chronicity and avoidance of treatment leading to the necessity of compulsory re-
feeding. 
There seems to be agreement that in most cases compulsory treatment is in the 
best interests of the individual.  It has been suggested, however, that the 
judgement and choices of the self-starving individual should be consulted if they 
“have been afflicted beyond the natural cycle of the disorder (which is between 
one and eight years)”, and their quality of life is low and unlikely to improve 
(Draper, 2000, p. 122).  Draper appears to have suggested that only once an 
individual has been repeatedly subjected to treatment without success should 
they be consulted about treatment or considered for palliative care.   
In this section I have considered professional discourses and practices relating to 
the use of compulsory treatment for those resisting re-feeding practices (e.g. that 
the MHA act is an important life-saving tool and that the self-starving individual’s 
resistance to being re-fed will change following weight gain), the outcomes of 
compulsory treatment and noted another perspective suggesting that compulsory 
re-feeding is only superficially effective.  Following on from this, I will consider 
alternative conceptualisations of self-starvation and ‘critical’ research into re-
feeding practices. 
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1.11. Feminist, Post-structuralist and Social Constructionist Critiques 
Feminist critiques have long argued that attempts to understand eating 
symptomatology and personal distress must go beyond individualised accounts 
of pathology and ideas that social-cultural norms about dieting and weight have 
been over-internalised (Hardin, 2001; Hepworth, 1999; Malson & Ussher, 1997; 
Malson, 1999).   
Research within feminist and poststructuralist frameworks has highlighted the 
complexity of practices of self-starvation and problematized the ways in which it 
has been conceptualised.  Hepworth (1999) and Hardin (2003a; 2003b; 2003c), 
for instance, have argued that anorexia nervosa is an object of discourse and not 
a reified disease.  Malson and Ussher (1997) stated that AN could be construed 
as a “metaphor for the manifestation of a multiplicity of contemporary socio-
cultural concerns” (p. 45) after starving oneself and fading away was described 
as self-destruction associated with “self-hatred, punishment and unhappiness”.  It 
was also described as a means of becoming less visible, which is paradoxical as 
the starved body becomes more scrutinised, to avoid ‘being me’ and assuming a 
gendered identity (Malson & Ussher, 1997, p. 51).  Hardin (2003a) explicated the 
ways in which the subject positions available to individuals diagnosed with AN 
folded back and constructed anorexic individuals.  Following this, Malson et al. 
(2011) described how the construction of an anorexic self makes it difficult for, or 
prevents, individuals from imagining their own recovery.  In contrast, constructing 
the self as separate from, and more complex, than eating practices and body 
weight created possibilities for “a future recovered self” (p. 33).   
Feminist and post-structuralist research has highlighted the “multiplicity of 
subjectivities” associated with self-starved bodies (Malson, 1988, p. 192).  The 
research also highlights the paradoxical practices of surveillance in different 
settings, for example, social-cultural surveillance to engage in body image 
dissatisfaction and weight loss practices and clinical surveillance to promote 
weight gain and ‘normal’ eating behaviours (Hepworth, 1999; Malson et al., 2011; 
Malson, 1998; Malson & Ussher, 1997).  It is from within these conflicting 
practices of surveillance and subjectifying practices, that the self-starving 
individual must negotiate her “recovery” (Hardin, 2003a).  
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In this section, I have briefly considered the ways in which the anorexic subject 
position has been understood as constructing and limiting an individual’s identity 
and potential recovery and summarised meanings associated with practices of 
self-starvation.  Below, I briefly discuss practices of the broader contexts within 
which re-feeding practices occur.  
1.12. Locating Re-feeding in Broader Strategies and Practices 
Since the 1970s, the ideology of risk has become increasingly dominant in the 
administration and treatment of mental health in parallel to the shift from the 
asylum to community care (Rose, 1998).  Prior to this, dangerousness, attributed 
to internal pathology, was used to refer to particular inhabitants of asylums.  In 
the context of managing patients with mental health diagnoses in the community, 
discourses of dangerousness were supplanted by discourses of risk (Castle, 
1991).  Statistical tools were employed by psychiatric professionals to identify 
populations who posed a risk to others and to themselves and compulsory 
intervention, under the Mental Health Act, could be used for those considered at 
high or immediate risk.   
Rose (1996b) has argued that, within ‘advanced liberal’ forms of government, 
psychiatrists and other mental health professional have become increasingly 
responsible for developing practices and methods for the ‘administration of risk’ 
against “a culture of blame, in which almost any unfortunate event becomes a 
‘tragedy’ which could have been avoided and for which some authority is to be 
held culpable” (p. 4).  Vassilev and Pilgrim (2007) stated that every reform in 
‘mental health’ legislation since the turn of the twentieth century has focused on 
setting out the conditions to prevent risk.   
Harper (2004) has described how the construction of a particular context provides 
certain possibilities but also certain constraints in the ways that stories are 
constructed and retold.  A context of predicting and minimising ‘risk’ is likely to 
support certain ways of constituting discourses and knowledge, such as ‘ethical’ 
and ‘scientific’/Hippocratic discourses which  emphasise the irresponsibility of not 
re-feeding the ‘starving’ person.  These dominant discourses, however, limit other 
discourses.   For example, Vassilev and Pilgrim (2007) suggest that “it is the 
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current climate of ‘risk’, the culture of risk assessment, and the politics of anxiety, 
that have led to more conservative decision making in politicians” (p. 352).  
Broader political decisions and practices infiltrate local practices, leading to 
increasing cultures of risk, anxiety and conservatism among practitioners working 
within public institutions.   
In this section, I have briefly considered the shift to, and increase in, discourses 
of risk, ‘psy’ professionals’ roles in administering risk and the impact of risk on 
local practices.  For a more thorough discussion on the topic of risk thinking see 
Castel (1991) and Hacking (1990).  In the following section, I set out the rationale 
for this thesis. 
1.13. Rationale for the Research 
As explicated in the previous sections, the short-term benefits and the poor long-
term outcomes associated with treatment focusing on weight restoration and 
‘normal’ eating are well known.  The problems of current constructions of 
anorexia in relation to negotiating recovery as ‘normal’ weight have also been 
highlighted.   Academic literature, mental health legislation and national 
evidence-based guidance, drawing on discourses of risk, however, continue to 
emphasise re-feeding as a primary intervention.   
Researchers have tended to make sense of poor treatment responses by 
focusing on ‘within-patient’ explanations (Malson et al., 2011).  For example, the 
published literature has commented on individuals’ ambivalence towards, 
avoidance of, or drop-out from treatment (Boughtwood & Halse, 2008; Guarda, 
2008; Nordbø, Espeset, Gulliksen & Skårderud, 2006; Ramsay et al., 1999).  I 
would argue, on the basis of post-structuralist reseach, that understanding 
anorexia as an ‘illness’ with a ‘chronic’ course and ‘slow recovery’ works to 
authenticate the construct of anorexia and the interventions offered and prevents 
the development of alternative perspectives.  
Building on the critical feminist and post-structuralist research in relation to 
Western conceptualisations of the thin or anorexic body, the current thesis will 
constitute an alternative account of re-feeding practices for self-starving 
individuals using a Foucauldian genealogical approach.   
16 
 
Before setting out the methodology chapter, in which I articulate the research 
strategies and tools guiding this thesis, I will briefly contextualise the theoretical-
analytical approach central to this thesis. 
1.14. Theoretical-Analytical Approach 
In this section, I briefly introduce the reader to Foucault’s work8 by summarising 
the context within which Foucault’s work emerged, drawing attention to the focus 
of his analytical work and explicating his theories of governmentality and bio-
power, which are central to this thesis.  This section is intended to orient the 
reader to the theoretical-analytical approach explicated in the methodology 
section. 
1.14.1. Introducing Foucault’s work9 
Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) analyses emerged within the context of debates 
between humanism and Marxism in France during the 1960s.  Within these 
debates, humanism was conceptualised as a product of bourgeois institutions 
attributing agency to individuals to minimise the effects of social structures, and 
Marxism was considered to offer a monolithic model of state power in terms of 
class relations.  The work of Foucault, Guattari and Lyotard, among others, 
emerged in relation to the need for a new critical theory to account for political 
change (Arribas-Allyon & Walkerdine, 2007).   
Foucault’s work focused on discourse; not in terms of offering a universal or 
structuralist account of linguistic systems, which was a dominant approach at the 
time, nor in terms of hermeneutics, conceptualising discourse as ‘meaning 
systems’ to be interpreted.  For Foucault, an ‘out there reality’ or universal laws 
were not waiting to be interpreted or discovered, rather, behind interpretations 
and descriptions were further interpretations (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).  
                                            
8
 Foucault was a prominent thinker and prolific and controversial writer who published an 
extensive corpus of work (Rabinow, 1994).  This introduction is limited to Foucault’s work which is 
most pertinent to the current thesis. 
9
 This section is descriptive to orient the reader to the present thesis and as such does not critique 
Foucault’s work. 
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Working ‘beyond structuralism and hermeneutics’10, Foucault’s work focused on 
discursive practices, which he characterised as:  
the demarcation of a field of objects, by the definition of a legitimate 
perspective for a subject of knowledge, by the setting of norms for 
elaborating concepts and theories.  Hence, each of them 
presupposes a play of prescriptions that govern exclusions and 
selections.  
(Foucault, 1994, p. 11)  
For Foucault, there was a historical dimension between the discursive practices 
which constitute our reality (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).   His objective, therefore, 
was to map out the history of the multiplicity of ways that persons develop 
knowledge about themselves within ‘games of truth’ (Foucault, 1994).    Foucault 
posited four types of technologies that were intertwined with how human beings 
were known and acted upon: 
1. Technologies of production 
2. Technologies of sign systems 
3. Technologies of power (or domination) 
4. Technologies of the self 
Foucault’s genealogical inquiries (e.g. Discipline and Punish; History of Sexuality) 
centred on analysing specific and local technologies to delineate the ways in 
which power constituted subjectivities.  In the following sections, I outline 
Foucault’s theories of governmentality and bio-power in relation to the latter two 
technologies: technologies of power and the self. 
1.14.2. Governing life 
In Discipline and Punish (1977a), Foucault analysed the transformation of 
disciplinary power from the mid-seventeenth century to the twentieth century in 
Western countries.  He delineated the shift from the sovereign’s absolute and 
unconditional power to judicial power, which was conditioned by the defence and 
                                            
10
 Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics is the title of Dreyfus and Rabinow’s 
book. 
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survival of the sovereign.  Both of these forms of power had the right to 
administer death.  Increasingly, power was not exercised in relation to the 
sovereign, but the state and its people.  Following this shift, the political power of 
‘government’, by which Foucault was referring to that activity of governing human 
existence through state institutions, became intertwined with the political function 
of “administering life” (Foucault, 1979b, p. 139):   
The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now 
carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the 
calculated management of life.   
(Foucault, 1979b, pp. 139-140). 
Starting in the seventeenth century, the domination of populations became more 
diffuse and less visible as power came to be exercised through strategies and 
techniques, distinct from government and judicial apparatus, which were seen to 
administer life (Foucault, 1977a).  The administration of life centred on two, 
initially separate, ‘poles’ which emerged during the classical period11.  The first 
pole centred on the “body as a machine” and the second pole, which developed 
later, was concerned with the “species body” (Foucault, 1979b, p. 139).   
The emergence of the concern with ‘the body’ was in the context of the rise of 
anatomical and biological technologies, which individualised and specified the 
human body.  In relation to these technologies, the body – as a site of ‘micro-
power’ – became viewed as an object to be broken down into its constituent 
parts, which could be made divided, reconstituted, manipulated and managed in 
relation to its parts and totality (Rabinow, 1991).  Over time, the dividing and 
signifying practices that had been applied to the body became increasingly 
minimised or ignored (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).   
Following the anatomo-political human body, various disciplines emerged to 
administer and manage the ‘species body’ or population.  During this period, 
disciplinary apparatuses such as universities, secondary schools, barracks and 
workshops developed alongside the emergence of increasing bio-political 
                                            
11
 Roughly from the middle of the seventeenth century through to the nineteenth century. 
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concerns relating to birth rates, mortality, life expectancy, public health, housing 
and migration (Foucault, 1979b).   
The “explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation 
of bodies and the control of populations” marked “the beginning of the era of the 
‘bio-power’” (Foucault, 1979b, p. 140).  The inscribed and disciplined individual 
body and the administered and regulated population were the surfaces upon 
which power was exercised. 
1.14.3. Bio-power  
The human body and the metaphorical body – the species body – continued to 
be distinct disciplinary technologies until the nineteenth century.  In the 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, these two poles of bio-power 
spread under the banner of improving the fitness of the nation (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982; Rose, 2001).   
The totalizing and individualizing technologies of bio-power, for instance, the 
increasingly detailed specifications and associated commentaries which divided 
up, compared, differentiated and ranked the individual in relation to populations, 
such as pupils, workers, soldiers, prisoners, patients within particular locales of 
apparatuses, were “inextricably bound up with the rise of the life sciences, the 
human sciences, clinical medicine” (Rose, 2001, p. 1).  The ‘objective’ human 
and social sciences emerged, with the goal of establishing regulative controls of 
the vitality of life and to increase the docility and usefulness of the individual 
body, and the modern individual become objectified, analysed and fixed (Dreyfus 
& Rabinow, 1982).  The ‘norm’ of the body and a normalising society – 
technologies of power or domination - emerged within the context of technologies 
of power that focused on administering life (Foucault, 1979b).   
Bio-power conjoined “the production of useful and docile individuals with the 
production of controlled and efficient populations” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982/1994, p. 193):    
Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living 
species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, 
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probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that 
could be modified, and spaces in which they could be distributed in 
an optimal manner.   
(Foucault, 1979b, p. 142). 
1.14.4. Summary 
Foucault’s work focused on analysing the ways in which the material and social 
body have become integral to power relations in modern society as life has 
become central to political strategies (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 112).  For 
Foucault, individuals and populations have become increasingly governed 
through “technologies of domination”, and not acts of repression, in which the 
human body and species body became objectified, divided and managed and 
known and acted upon, or subjectified, by the self (Foucault, 1982).   The 
interweaving of technologies to dominate others and the self – govermentality – 
spread within the context of “administering life”: 
The ‘right’ to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the 
satisfaction of needs, and beyond all oppressions or ‘alienations’, 
the ‘right to rediscover what one is and all that one can be.  
(Foucault, 1979b, p. 145) 
Following the work of Foucault, I will attempt to trace the relations in which 
knowledges about the self and others are intertwined.  In the following chapter, I 
explicate Foucault’s genealogical approach to analysis and the research 
strategies and tools guiding this thesis.    
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2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Introduction to Methodology 
In this chapter, I articulate the material-discursive epistemological position I have 
adopted and its relation to a Foucauldian genealogical inquiry.  Following this, I 
position myself within the study.  I then locate genealogy within the context of 
Foucault’s work and describe the features of genealogical research, before 
explicating how I have interpreted and conceptualised the genealogical research 
strategies to guide this thesis. 
2.2. Epistemology 
Epistemology determines the theory and analysis underpinning the research 
investigation (Ussher, 1996).  I have found that engaging with the work of 
Foucault and others who have developed Foucault’s genealogical investigations, 
such as Rose, Tamboukou, Hook and Ussher, has helped me to reflect and find 
coherence between my own epistemological position, which had been influenced 
by social constructionism, and a Foucauldian genealogical approach. 
Social constructionism refers to related epistemological positions which share the 
following key assumptions: “a critical stance toward taken-for-granted 
knowledge”, “historical and cultural specificity”, “knowledge […] sustained by 
social processes” and “knowledge and social action [...] together” (Gergen, 1985, 
cited in Burr, 2003, pp. 2-5).  Burr (2003) has associated Foucault’s work and 
analytics of power, particularly within Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, with macro 
social constructionism.  Others whose work has drawn on Foucault’s 
genealogical theory and analysis have criticised the language of social 
constructionism.  They have suggested, for example, that it implies that there is 
nothing ‘real’ behind discourse (Ussher, 2011) and that it replaces one form of 
essentialism, naturalism, with another, discourse or social determinism 
(Blackman, 2008).  It has also been argued that the language of social 
constructionism reinforces the binaries in the free will and determinism debate 
(Butler, 1990; Rose, 1999), which Butler suggests separates the natural and the 
social and, in doing so, reifies the material by positioning it as distinct from, and 
more real than, discursive practices.  Deconstruction, the work often associated 
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with social constructionism, also implies an end in itself, the production of another 
truth or ‘anti-truth’, which Foucault set out to avoid in his archaeological and 
genealogical work.  
Rose has argued that “less insecure scientific domains have long accepted that 
scientific truth is a matter of construction” (1989/1999, p. 51) and that attempts to 
“reveal the constructive character of scientific knowledge in order to ‘deconstruct’ 
it (…) paradoxically saves empiricism” because “it bases itself on the very 
territory it seeks to reproach” (Rose, 1999, p. 52).  A material-discursive position 
attempts to move away from the dualism – real world and constructed world – 
which Rose, Butler and Ussher have suggested social constructionism reinforces. 
2.3. A Material-discursive Position 
A material-discursive epistemological position implies an inseparable and 
complex relationship between nature and culture in which human beings are 
brought into being and made understandable, objectively and subjectively, in 
relation to discursive practices.  Discursive practices refer to more than language; 
they include, for example, technologies, apparatuses and practices.  Foucault, for 
instance, spoke of the ‘technologies of the self’ to refer to the processes though 
which the subjectification of oneself and others – or subjectivities12 – are created 
(Kendall & Wickham, 1999).  Within this position, I am not denying reality: as 
Rose puts it “[t]hat which is invented is not an illusion; it constitutes our truth” (p. 
3).   Blackman, focusing on the body, illustrates the complex relationality between 
the material and the discursive in relation to our truths: 
We bring particular bodies into being and the production or 
performance of such bodies is intimately connected to the practices, 
techniques and artefacts which make different bodies possible.  In 
this approach to corporeality or materiality bodies are real but they 
are also made, remade and even unmade. 
(Blackman, 2008, p. 124) 
                                            
12
 ‘Subjectivities’ has been used by Rose (1996, 1999/1989) and critical feminist theorist such as 
Ussher (1997; 2011), Butler (1990) and Malson (1998) to refer to discourses and discursive 
practices in which the subject comes to be known and knows and acts on his or herself within the 
nexus of power-knowledge-self.   
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Blackman, who has written about material-discursive practices, has drawn on 
Foucauldian and feminist theoretical-analytical frameworks in her work.  Feminist 
theorists have argued that masculine discourses and discursive practices have 
been central to the making, remaking and unmaking of reality and in doing so 
constituting women and femininity as other and negative to men (Butler, 1990; 
Malson, 1998; Malson & Ussher, 1997; Ussher, 2011).  Feminist researchers 
have also critiqued notions of ‘objective’ research and highlighted the importance 
of reflexivity within research practices. 
2.4. Reflexivity  
Burr (2003) has stated that reflexivity includes recognition that the 
epistemological judgements and analysis applied to other forms of knowledge 
also apply to one’s own research and associated claims.  As briefly discussed in 
section 1.3, reflexivity13 also refers to owning and stating one’s own values and 
positions, in relation to one’s political agenda or history, for instance, which 
informs every stage of the research (Burr, 2003).   
For Foucault, truth cannot be known independently from the procedures of its 
production and therefore the task of the genealogist is to “criticise, diagnose and 
demythologise ‘truth phenomena’” (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 202).  Commenting on 
the production of his work, Foucault is aware of the contingent and temporally 
located status of his own work: 
I am fully aware that I have never written anything other than 
fictions.  For all that I would not want to say that they were outside 
of the truth.  It seems plausible to me to make fictions work within 
truth, to introduce truth effects with a fictional discourse, and in 
some way to make discourse arouse, ‘fabricate’ something which 
does not yet exist, thus to fiction something.  One ‘fictions’ history 
starting from a political reality which renders it true, one ‘fictions’ a 
politics that does not yet exist starting from a historical truth. 
(Foucault, 1979a, p. 75) 
                                            
13
 Although I continue to use the language of reflexivity, I recognise its limitations and am aware 
that all that I have ‘thought’ or experienced has occurred in a multitude of ‘intra-actions’.  
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Similarly, I view this thesis as a “fabrication of something that does not yet exist”, 
which does not undermine its attempt to trace the heterogeneous processes of 
production that led to, and sustain, the practice of re-feeding as a primary 
treatment regimen for self-starving individuals.   
In a discussion of the researcher’s relationship to his or her work, Tamboukou 
(2010) highlighted Haraway’s (1997) critique of the language of reflexivity for 
implying a search for the “authentic and really real”.  Moving away from notions of 
reflexivity, reflectivity and inter-actions, Tamboukou has connected with the idea 
of intra-actions, used by Barad.  Barad, a physicist and feminist theorist, uses the 
term intra-actions to denote “how entities – both human and non-human – occur 
as relations between components” (cited in Tamboukou, 2010, p. 9).  An analysis 
of knowledge-truth-power intra-actions14 is central to a genealogical approach.  
Intra-actions also refer to “the multifarious entanglements – both material and 
discursive – between ‘the researcher’, ‘the research object’ and ‘the research 
context’” (Tamboukou, 2010, p. 12), which illustrates and draws attention to how I 
am imbricated within the production of this thesis. 
2.5. Contextualising Genealogy 
Foucault used genealogy as a methodological device for doing effective 
histories15 or histories of the present which were “concerned with the processes, 
procedures and apparatus by which truth and knowledge are produced” 
(Tamboukou, 1999, p. 202) and lead to taken-for-granted assumptions about 
what we know and how we have and can come to know ‘truths’ about things in 
the world.  Foucault’s use of genealogical analysis in Discipline and Punish and 
The History of Sexuality marked a methodological shift away from his 
archaeology projects (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982), in which Foucault’s analysis 
                                            
14
 Intra-actions refer to the dynamic and inseparable relations between the focus of the research, 
the researcher’s methodological approach and researcher’s contexts.  The activities and 
outcomes of intra-actions are conceptualised as one system, which is different to ideas of multiple 
systems, which can be separated out and known (i.e. research focus, methodology, and 
researcher’s beliefs and background), interacting 
15
 “History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being – 
as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets itself against 
itself” (Foucault, 1977b, p. 154). 
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had focused on discourse through the analysis of the technologies of signs 
systems  and technologies of production (Tamboukou, 1999).  
Foucault’s genealogical investigations moved away from the dualism of the 
discursive and non-discursive evident in his archaeological projects towards a 
topographical approach which attempted “to show how discursive and non-
discursive formations coexist in various forms of correlation, opposition or 
juxtaposition” (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 205).  As Sembou (2011) commented, 
Foucault continued with “Nietzsche’s tradition of ‘philosophizing with the 
hammer’” (p. 5), in order to fragment ‘truths’ which appear to be without history or 
are thought to correspond to an underlying reality.  In Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History, his most explicit paper about his genealogical work, Foucault examined 
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (1913) and considered the objectives 
of genealogy.  Discussing the different vocabulary Nietzsche employed, Foucault 
distinguished Ursprung (origins), which implies a deeper reality or essence to be 
revealed, from Entstehung (emergence) and Herkunft (descent).  Foucault stated 
that there is “not a timeless and essential secret” behind things but instead “the 
secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion of alien forms” (1971, p. 142).  Therefore, the task of the 
genealogist is to analyse the emergence and descent and capture the 
discontinuity and dissension within ‘the process of production’ of the things taken 
to be ‘truths’. 
Gordon (1980) stated that in his use and development of archaeological and 
genealogical methods, Foucault was not intending to repudiate or replace other 
methodological approaches such as those of “historical sociology and ethnology 
but to make available to historical analysis a whole additional range of objects 
and relations” (cited in Tamboukou & Ball, 2003, p.18). 
2.6. Key Features of Genealogical Research 
In contrast to traditional histories, which focus on a historical period and produce 
chronological narratives of great men and great discoveries and inventions 
through time, Foucault’s effective histories have been concerned with a problem-
based approach to history (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).  A problem-based 
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approach “demythologises” notions of the present as a product of universal laws 
and sequential development through the problematization and examination of the 
most familiar and everyday truths and practices (Kendall & Wickam, 1999; 
Tamboukou, 1999).  A genealogical analysis examines the discursive practices at 
play and seeks to disturb the certainties of truth and their history to “produce as 
awareness of the complexity, contingency, and, fragility of historical forms” 
(Smart, 1983, p. 76).     
In this sense, Foucault’s work has been referred to as anti-ontological, in that it 
does not seek to provide an alternative or more true truth (Hook, 2007; Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999) or deconstruct truths to produce an anti-truth (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999; Tamboukou, 1999).  Rather than denying the truth, reality or 
utility of an object or event that we have come to know, genealogy attempts to 
show that the object or event “is best grasped as a complex of factors, a poised 
moment of converging contingencies and intersecting lines of force rather than a 
self-sustained, autonomous entity” (Hook, 2007, p. 145).   
2.6.1 Descent and emergence 
In exploring how, and not why, an object or event achieved epistemological 
coherence, a genealogical inquiry scrutinises the complex and multiple processes 
surrounding its emergence in order to trace the strategies, technologies and 
apparatus, which work together to produce truth and knowledge.   It does not 
assume that truths will lead us to liberation but examines the nexus of relations 
between the object and political objectives (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).  
According to Tamboukou and Ball (2003), Deleuze (1992) has described this as a 
process of drawing maps which illustrate the matrix of relations connected to the 
problematization.  Concerned with mapping the analysis of descent, as opposed 
to depth and hidden meaning, the genealogist as a topographer focuses on 
tracing the working of practices and constructs “a polygon rather than a 
polyhedron” (Foucault, 1991, p. 77).  Foucault has compared the moment of 
genealogy  to “an overview, from higher and higher up, which allows the depth to 
be laid out in front of him in a more and more profound visibility; depth is re-
situated as an absolutely superficial secret” (Foucault, 1967b, p. 187). 
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Genealogy begins with a “diagnosis of the current situation” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982, p. 119); an examination of current discourse and discursive practices.  The 
tracing and analysis of descent examines localised practices “without taking 
anything for granted” and exploring the “countless historical transformations” of 
what people do and have done (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 209).  The genealogist 
looks for meaning in ‘surface practices’ and not, as already discussed, in terms of 
essences or origins.  This process seeks to capture the complexity of an object’s 
descent; isolating “the errors, the false appraisals … the faulty calculations that 
gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us” (Foucault, 
1977, p. 146).   
Although Rose (2007b) has stated that making contingencies visible is no longer 
‘radical’, it is worth remembering that Foucault was writing and publishing in the 
1970s when structuralist theories, founded upon the assumption that there was a 
“deeper reality underlying the surface features of the world” (Burr, 2003, p. 11), 
were dominant in history, sociology, linguistics and some areas of psychology, for 
example, the theories of Freud and Piaget.  Foucault’s genealogical research 
strategies did not suppose or search beneath the surface for governing rules and 
structures but instead sought to describe the surface of events and practices in 
terms of their emergence, interrelatedness, disconnectedness, mutations and 
temporality.  In section 2.7, I explicate the perspectival dimensions, which inform 
the genealogical research strategies employed in this thesis, to trace the surface 
of emergence and descent.  This is followed by the analysis and discussion 
chapter, in which I have attempted to map out and analyse the surface of 
emergence; capturing the diversity, discontinuity and contingencies of events and 
practices surrounding the emergence of re-feeding practices, and the tracing of 
descent; how events and practices have mutated, shifted or stayed the same 
over time and in relation to what conditions.  
Genealogy is interested in the field of historical action in which the object or 
practice is brought in to being.  Neither the state nor an individual subject is at the 
centre of the field of action and, therefore, responsible for the emergence of the 
object/practice. For Foucault, truth and power are not the result of psychological 
motivation or ‘will to power’ (Hook, 2007).  Psychological motivation is the result 
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of strategy and not strategists, as Foucault states, “no one is responsible for the 
emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice” (1977b, 
p. 150). 
2.6.2. Power-knowledge 
Power is central to Foucault’s genealogical works (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).  
For Foucault power was positive, diffuse and ubiquitous (McNay, 1994); it was 
not a substance that acts on things: 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation 
and not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are 
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising 
this power. 
      (Foucault, 1980, p. 98).   
Power cannot be analysed independently from knowledge or truth (Rose 1999).  
In his later work, focusing on the production of the self, Foucault conceptualised 
power, the subject and knowledge as three interdependent axes, which lead to 
the subjectification of oneself and others (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).  It is in its 
productiveness that Foucault formulated power as positive and following this 
Butchart (1988), for example, argued “there can be no objects of knowledge in 
the absence of methods for their production” (p. 184).  Kendall and Wickham 
(1999) have drawn on the metaphor of power as source of energy to illustrate 
how power is both mundane and productive in maintaining connections.  Drawing 
on Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, Kendall and Wickham (1999) have 
illustrated how power operates as double relation between the visibilities of the 
object or event and what can be said or known about the object or event; for 
instance, the visible prison produces statements about criminality and criminality 
produces forms of visibility which reinforces the prison.   
2.7. Perspectival Dimensions 
Rose (1999; 1996) has suggested that the following dimensions, which are best 
described as perspectival, can sensitise the genealogical analysis on the nexus 
29 
 
of relations and connections between subject-knowledge-power.  In this section, I 
briefly explicate the five dimensions, namely strategies, authorities, technologies, 
subjectivities and problematizations, that were central to the analysis in this 
thesis.  These perspectival dimensions alongside a reading of Foucualdian theory 
have helped me to apply a Foucauldian theoretical-analytical lens to this 
research. 
2.7.1. Strategies 
Strategies direct us to the connections between practices and techniques for 
knowing and shaping human beings and broader moral, social, or political 
concerns or aspirations, which are connected to ideas about the undesirable and 
desirable conduct and features within populations (e.g. “prevention of 
degeneration, eugenic maximisation of the fitness of the race, minimisation of the 
cost of social maladjustment through mental hygiene…”) (Rose, 1996, p. 28).  It 
includes the relations and distinctions between political and ‘non-political’ 
authorities and apparatuses involved in governing conduct and human beings.  
The governance of conduct and shaping of subjectivities is possible within a 
network of knowledge-subject-power, in which power is exercised through the 
relations between these five perspectival dimensions. 
2.7.2. Authorities 
This dimension refers to those who have, or claim, authority or expertise “to 
speak truthfully about humans, their nature and their problems”; the apparatuses 
which legitimate authorities or expertise (e.g. the courts, universities, politics); the 
relationship between authority and “a claim to positive knowledge”; the “relation 
between authorities and those who are subject to them: priest and parishioner, 
doctor and patient, manager and employee, therapist and client”; the governance 
of authorities, for example, by “legal codes, by the market, by the protocols of 
bureaucracy, by professional ethics” (Rose, 1996, p. 27). 
2.7.3. Technologies 
Technologies refer to the assembly of practices, techniques and apparatuses that 
have been created to govern the human being and to shape conduct within the 
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broader moral, political and economic strategies (Rose, 1998, p. 26).  These 
include practices of judgement, division and classification (e.g. examinations and 
assessments with their associated norms), techniques and programmes focused 
on intervention or prevention and the apparatuses or institutions within which 
techniques and programmes are structured and implemented (e.g. the school, 
hospital, prison).  Technologies also refer to the practices, techniques and 
apparatuses which constitute how we come to know and act upon ourselves as 
human beings – processes of subjectification, discussed in more detail below.   
2.7.4. Subjectivities  
Subjectivities direct our attention to the ways in which human beings have come 
to be known (i.e. their ontological status); how they can be known (e.g. through 
observation, testing, confessional practices); the type of person they should strive 
to be; the techniques and practices they can apply to themselves for self-
improvement, autonomy and fulfilment (Rose, 1999).  Subjectivities emerge in 
relation to technologies of power and the self, which are imbricated within the 
broader strategies and which have the authority to impose particular frameworks 
or conceptualisations of knowing others and ourselves. 
2.7.5. Problematizations 
Problematizations sensitise us to the ways in which human beings have become 
understood as problematic, in relation to strategies, authorities, technologies and 
subjectivities, explicated above.  Practices and ways of being, for example, 
normal, mad, deviant, are rendered problematic in relation to overarching moral, 
political and economic strategies, within particular apparatuses or institutions and 
through sanctioned knowledges and practices (Rose, 1999, p. xi).   
So far I have discussed five perspectival dimensions which are central to the 
Foucauldian theoretical framework informing this attempt at a genealogical 
inquiry.  In the following sections I describe my corpus of data and 
operationalized these five dimensions in relation to my research.  
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2.8. Corpus of statements 
In accordance with a genealogical approach, I will not be seeking to produce an 
account of coherent narratives and underlying reality.  Instead, I will be focusing 
on interrogating the workings of discursive practices in which knowledge about 
re-feeding regimes have been constituted (Tamboukou, 1999) and are located 
within regimes of truth (Rose, 1996).  My data sources, or corpus of statements, 
will include official publications and published research and commentaries within 
psychological, psychiatric and medical journals and book chapters, pertaining to 
re-feeding and weight restoration treatment practices.  These sources represent 
“expert discourses” within psychiatry, psychology and allied disciplines.  One 
potential limitation of drawing statements from within the official and academic 
literature is that it is possible that there will be a lack of counter-discourses and 
resistances because the acceptance of journals and invitations to  participate in 
the construction of guidelines are associated with adherence to the norms and 
standards within the rhetorics of truth (Rose, 1996a, p. 55). 
Foucault (1977b) stated that genealogy “requires patience and a knowledge of 
details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source materials” (p. 140).  
Carabine (2001) reported that she spent years immersing herself in the primary, 
secondary and related data sources for her genealogical investigation of 
unmarried motherhood.   For the current investigation – a professional doctoral 
thesis – I have a defined time-frame in which to complete the genealogy and, 
therefore, I needed to define inclusion criteria to delimit my corpus of statements, 
while ensuring that it included temporal variation.   
Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2007) emphasise the importance of the temporal 
variability of the corpus of statements selected in order to analyse the 
discontinuities of practice over time to show how an object or practice has “been 
spoken about differently in the past and exposed to different forms of regulation 
… and reform” (p. 100).  They suggest that the internal validity of the statements 
is through their role in determining the conditions of possibility for the object or 
practice being investigated. 
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The source materials for the current study comprise a corpus of statements taken 
from official guidance produced by, or in partnership, with professional or 
governing bodies and key texts which capture the academic and clinical 
literature.  The inclusion criteria for the selection of papers for the past and 
present case narratives (see section 3.1) were critical time points: the first re-
feeding treatment study within the published literature and current treatment 
practices.  Dally and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) new treatment (see section 3.1.1) 
was the first treatment study identified in a database search.  Current practice 
guidance for treating ‘mental disorders’ within the NHS is provided by NICE and 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists [RCP].  NICE and RCP guidance relating to the 
treatment of anorexia were, therefore, selected as the basis of current treatment 
practices.  In order to capture temporal variation while limiting the volume of 
source materials, one key text, which provided multiple perspectives, was 
included for each decade.  A list of the documents that form the corpus of 
statements and a rationale for the inclusion of each document can be found in 
appendix E. 
2.9. Method 
Carabine (2001) stated that genealogy is more about methodology, which she 
has defined as the philosophical and epistemological assumptions underlying and 
informing the research process, than it is about method, the techniques for 
selecting and analysing the data.   
In her Exploration of Foucault’s Strategies for Doing Research, Tamboukou 
(1999) considered the “theoretical and methodological dimensions” of 
Foucauldian genealogy and reflected on the challenges of undertaking a 
genealogical approach because of the absence of a unified theory or 
methodology (Tamboukou & Ball, 2003, p. 2).  Foucault did not articulate a 
closed theoretical framework (Rose 1999) or follow a set of structured 
methodological principles (Tamboukou, 1999).  The implications of working with 
an open methodological framework pose challenges for the researcher.  My 
previous research experience prior to this thesis has always been within a closed 
methodological framework, such as statistical analysis, or qualitative analysis 
with fairly prescribed procedural steps.  As a novice genealogist, I worked to 
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challenge my need for prescription and certainty and, instead, sought to build a 
Foucauldian theoretical-analytical lens from which to interrogate the ‘corpus of 
statements’.  
Instead of following a prescriptive method, Tamboukou suggested that Foucault’s 
genealogies create a “methodological rhythm of their own and pose questions 
which invite us to interrogate what we know” (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 215).    In 
undertaking effective or critical histories of the ‘sciences of man’ Foucault invited 
researchers to approach his theories “as tools for analysis” (Tamboukou & Ball, 
2003, p. 1).  Those who have continued with genealogical investigations; for 
example, Butler, Malson, Rose, Tamboukou and Ussher, have also steered clear 
of providing a formula for doing genealogy.  Formalising the approach would 
have the potential to take genealogy within positivist knowledges, something 
Foucault sought to avoid (Rose, 1999).  As Tamboukou and Ball (2003) assert, 
the goal is not to replace one set of epistemological certainties with another but to 
“introduce a constant instability into our assumptions about ‘doing research’ and 
making theory” (p. 10). 
2.9.1. Tools for analysis 
Consistent with the theoretical assumptions that oppose the definition of a closed 
genealogical method, in the following section I outline the research strategies or 
tools for analysis that have directed the current genealogical exploration.  The 
research strategies are centred on my understanding and intra-actions with 
Rose’s (1999/1989; 1996) perspectival dimensions explicated in section 2.7, 
which were informed by Foucault’s theoretical conceptualisation of bio-power 
discussed in section1.14.3.  In the following chapter, analysis and discussion, I 
attempt to trace the surface of emergence and descent (concepts described in 
section 2.6.1) of re-feeding practices (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2007). 
I have devised questions that correspond to the five perspectival dimensions to 
help me to interrogate my corpus of statements within a Foucauldian theoretical-
analytical framework.  In compiling these questions, which I present below, I draw 
on the taxonomy of questions provided by Rose (1999; 1996a) and considered 
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Tamboukou’s (1999) reflections on the types of questions that could direct a 
genealogical inquiry.   
2.9.2. Questions to help interrogate the data 
Problematizations Where, how, by whom and for whom have the practices of re-feeding been 
rendered essential, according to what systems of judgement in relation to 
what concerns?  
Technologies What are the practices of judgement, division and classification that relate 
to re-feeding?  What techniques and programmes guide re-feeding 
practices?  Within which apparatuses do re-feeding practices take place? 
Authorities How is power exercised within the production and proliferation of 
discourses relating to these practices?  Where is there resistance to re-
feeding practices and what it the impact of resistance?  How are the 
knowledge, techniques and sites related to re-feeding practices governed? 
Subjectivities What subjectivities are produced through the practice of re-feeding?  What 
are the subject positions eclipsed by this practice? 
Strategies How is re-feeding linked to practices of normalisation, and to wider social, 
moral or political objectives about the desirable features of populations?  
In this chapter I have articulated my epistemological position, discussed 
genealogy as a theoretical-analytical approach and outlined the research tools or 
strategies that have guided the genealogical analysis in this thesis. In chapter 3, I 
attempt a genealogical exploration of re-feeding through the analysis of 
emergence and descent. 
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3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION16 
In this chapter, I provide a rationale for drawing on case narratives as a starting 
point for my analysis and then describe and contextualise past and present case 
examples.  Following on from this, in section 3.2, I explicate the surface of 
emergence of the historical case narrative and, in section 3.3, I present the 
analysis of descent.   
3.1. Past and Present Re-feeding Practices 
In the previous chapter, I discussed Foucault’s research strategies and outlined a 
number of strategies and tools for analysis that are central to this thesis.  In the 
following section, following Foucault’s way of using narratives to elaborate his 
concepts17, I present two exemplary cases that capture the ways that re-feeding 
has been conceptualised as a problem and a clinical practice for self-starving 
individuals who come into contact with services.  The case studies portray 
historical and current practices and form the starting point for my attempt to trace 
the surface of emergence and descent of re-feeding practices while identifying 
and analysing the five perspectival dimensions which relate to technologies of 
power and the self.  Before presenting each case study, I provide a context and 
justify its inclusion. 
3.1.1. Past practices 
In the NICE (2004) clinical guidelines, which have summarised the core 
interventions in the treatment and management for anorexia nervosa and other 
eating disorders, the authors briefly discuss past and present treatment practices 
within the NHS.  They begin by stating that, for the first half of the twentieth 
century, anorexia nervosa was typically managed and treated by general 
physicians and “[t]reatment consisted of bed rest, often in a side room of a 
general medical ward” (NICE 2004, p. 30).  The authors stated that psychiatry’s 
interest and involvement in working with anorexia nervosa emerged in the middle 
of the twentieth century.  Commenting on the few psychiatrists who initially took 
an interest in ‘the condition’, the authors referred to Dr Peter Dally and Dr William 
                                            
16
 I have combined the analysis and discussion sections in line with a genealogical approach.   
17
 I refer here to the two dramatic scenes in Discipline and Punish. 
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Sargant, physicians in psychological medicine at Westminster Hospital and St. 
Thomas’s Hospital, London, who used physical methods18 of treatment.  
According to the authors, Professors Arthur Crisp and Gerald Russell, academic 
psychiatrists, also began to take an interest in “the condition” (NICE, 2004). 
Following on from NICE’s reference to psychiatry’s initial interest in anorexia, I 
tried to identify the earliest account of re-feeding practices in the NHS in the UK.   
I hand searched the reference lists in early papers to find accounts of treatment 
of AN in the mid-twentieth century19.  My search identified two papers by D. W. K. 
Kay, a psychiatrist at the Maudsley Hospital, in the 1950s.  Kay (1953) and Kay 
and Leigh (1954) described treatment practices at the time, including bed rest 
and a high calorie diet, psychoanalysis, leucotomy and electroconvulsive therapy 
(ECT), but were not treatment studies.  Kay and Leigh’s (1954) detailed case 
analysis of 38 patients led them to conclude that heterogeneity among the 
“psychiatric symptomatology” indicated that anorexia nervosa was not a distinct 
clinical entity or syndrome (p. 428).   
After the work of Kay and Leigh, my search for the earliest study of re-feeding 
practices in the NHS identified research published by Dally and Sargant in 1960 
and 1966.  In A New Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa (1960) and Treatment and 
outcome of anorexia nervosa (1966), both published in the British Medical 
Journal [BMJ], Dally and Sargant explicated and evaluated their “new treatment” 
programme which they developed to treat the “syndrome” of AN.  Interestingly, 
perhaps, they do not refer to Kay’s work.  These two papers have formed the 
basis of the historical case study presented in detail below. 
Dally and Sargant’s (1960) “new treatment” combined chlorpromazine20 and 
insulin within a re-feeding regime and was prescribed to patients who were 
inpatients in their London hospitals.  
                                            
18
 The physical methods of psychiatry, during this period, included insulin therapy (an insulin 
induced coma), psychosurgery, ECT and psychopharmacological treatments. 
19
 The mid-twentieth century was chosen as a starting point in relation to the claims in the NICE 
guidelines about psychiatry’s early involvement in AN and because my reading made me aware 
that diagnoses of Simmonds’ disease displaced AN until this time (discussed in section 3.3.3). 
20
 Chlorpromazine is a neuroleptic drug, often referred to as an antipsychotic, with sedative 
effects, which was introduced into psychiatric practices in the 1950s (Moncrieff, 2009). 
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Describing the events surrounding their decision to use chlorpromazine and 
insulin, Dally and Sargant stated that treatment in AN had not advanced in the 
seventy-five years since Gull “recognized that the patient’s refusal to eat was due 
to ‘a morbid mental state’” and that “patients should be fed at regular intervals 
and surrounded by persons who would have moral control over them”.  They 
commented that despite all kinds of ‘moral’ persuasion, these patients continued 
to refuse to eat, which was dangerous as evidenced by the death of 15% of 
patients in “[a] recent study from the Maudsley Hospital”21. Dally and Sargant 
claimed that treatments that had been used on patients diagnosed with anorexia, 
including thyroid, insulin, and cortisone hormonal treatments, ECT (electro-
convulsive therapy) and modified leucotomy, ranged from being ineffective to 
harmful.  They claimed, however, that the physical methods such as ECT and 
modified leucotomy were preferable to the “much graver risks of allowing states 
of inanition to continue indefinitely”.  Dally and Sargant argued that the failings of 
treatments in achieving weight gain had led to a resurgence of tube feeding, 
which they suggested was the best alternative to modified leucotomy but 
undesirable from a psychological point of view.  In this context, Dally and Sargant 
were offering their new treatment (1960, p. 1770). 
The patients included in the paper met the “essential criteria” for the “syndrome” 
of anorexia nervosa.  The criteria are reproduced below (Dally & Sargant, 1960, 
p. 1770):  
1. Refusal to eat, whether or not accompanied by anorexia at the start; 
2. Severe loss of weight; 
3. Absence of evidence of schizophrenia, severe depression, or organic 
disease; 
4.  Amenorrhea of at least three months’ duration in female patients. 
The new treatment method prescribed total bed rest until the patient had 
regained near normal weight.  In addition to bed rest and high calorie meals, the 
patients were heavily sedated with chlorpromazine and modified insulin therapy.  
Doses of chlorpromazine were commenced with 150mg a day and this dose was 
increased to 1000mg per day for patients who were considered to be “difficult”.  
                                            
21
 This study, which was not referenced, was the study by Kay and Leigh (1954) described above. 
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In the second paper Dally and Sargant reported that they had increased the 
dosage of chlorpromazine, administering up to 1600mg per day if necessary, 
“until the patient’s resistance to eating is overcome” and “she loses her 
customary sense of panic at the sight of food and usual epigastric discomfort 
which follows eating”.  In parallel to the chlorpromazine, patients were started on 
modified insulin therapy (MIT), which would have been likely to produce a sub-
coma state.  The insulin was started at five units and the dose was progressively 
increased “until the patient sweats and becomes drowsy”.  The insulin therapy 
was interrupted during meal times.  Meals were light to begin with and included 
fortified mild drink and the daily calorie intake was increased from 1,500 to 4,000 
calories (Dally & Sargant, 1960, p. 1771).   
Dally and Sargant (1960) stated that 
“[m]ost patients began to gain weight 
almost at once when treated with the 
combination of chlorpromazine and 
insulin”.  Fig. 3.1.1.a is a ‘before and 
after’ photographic presentation in 
their discussion of the results.  The 
authors claimed that this patient’s 
“‘belly touched her backbone’ on 
admission” and that she was 
“depressed, untruthful, and resisted 
all attempts to make her eat”.  
Following five weeks of the new 
treatment this woman was described 
as “cheerful, co-operative, and almost 
normal after a gain in weight of 20lb. 
(9kg.).” (p. 1772).    
Fig. 3.1.1.a Photographs of patient 
before and after treatment 
The priority of the new treatment was weight gain and Dally and Sargant stated 
that attempts to uncover psychological difficulties were halted until the weight 
was restored to the normal level.  Once weight was restored, medication was 
reduced or stopped altogether, and the patient was discharged if she continued 
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to eat satisfactorily one week after the target weight was reached (Dally & 
Sargant, 1960, p. 1771). Information about how the psychological difficulties were 
uncovered was not provided in either paper. 
In their follow-up article, Dally and Sargant (1966) reported their results for the 
“48 anorexia patients” who had received the new treatment between 1957 and 
1962.  Reporting on the outcomes they stated that “treatment with 
chlorpromazine and modified insulin resulted in a large and rapid gain in weight, 
however resistant initially the patient was to eating”, and that it “seems probable 
that the important factor in this combined method is chlorpromazine, which 
lessens the patient’s fear of and resistance to eating” (p. 794).   
In addition to its tranquilizing effects, chlorpromazine also led to signs of 
Parkinsonism in eight patients, which included “dyskentic reactions” (involuntary 
jerky movements) and “restlessness (akathisia)”.  Individuals also complained of 
drowsiness, blurred vision, and a dry mouth; side effects associated with 
chlorpromazine. Five patients also had a grand-mal seizure “within the first 
fortnight of starting treatment”.  Dally and Sargant, however, reflected on the 
success of their treatment in inducing weight gain and stated that even “though 
initially the patients can be very debilitated”, the treatment programme was 
“surprisingly free of dangerous complications” (1966, p. 794). 
Despite the treatment’s success in the speed and volume of weight gain – 
patients treated with the new treatment gained twice as much weight as 
individuals treated with bed rest and a high calorie diet – one third of the 30 
individuals with a shorter history of anorexia nervosa were readmitted following 
weight loss within two-years.  Outcomes were only provided for the 30 individuals 
who had been “ill” for less than four years.  Dally and Sargant (1966) stated that 
by the end of three years approximately two thirds of those treated with either the 
new treatment or other means “had made a satisfactory recovery” (p. 795).  Less 
satisfactorily, perhaps, they reported that forty-five per cent of those treated with 
the new treatment, compared to 12% of those treated by other means, no longer 
resisted food but that they compulsively overate and became overweight. 
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Of the remaining 18 individuals, who had previously received treatment and been 
ill for five years of more, they concluded that it was unlikely that restoring weight 
alone would have much effect and that the “outlook is gloomy” for patients with 
chronic anorexia (1966, p. 795).   For example, eight “chronic anorexics” steadily 
lost weight after returning home.  Three individuals with chronic anorexia, 
however, “did extremely well following the weight gain; they retained their weight, 
they resumed menstruation, and one, a married woman, became pregnant” and 
one person recovered spontaneously after 25 years (Dally & Sargant, p. 795). 
Reflecting on the future for patients given a diagnosis of anorexia, Dally and 
Sargant stated that “[m]ost anorexia nervosa patients are backward in their 
psychosexual development and consequently have considerable conflicts over 
their sexual feelings and behaviour.  None the less, these girls are able to marry 
and have children, although in some instances at least they do so in order to ‘be 
like everyone else’ rather than through a more mature sense of love” (1966, p. 
795). 
The case narratives presented above will be revisited in tracing the surface of 
emergence and descent in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.1.2. Present practices 
In this section the case narratives illustrate how re-feeding practices for self-
starving individuals have changed, and how they have stayed the same, since 
Dally and Sargant’s new treatment in the 1960s. 
In selecting the material for the present case narrative, I turned to NICE clinical 
guidance (2004) which provides an introduction to the stepped approach to the 
treatment of self-starving individuals.  In a stepped approach, the intervention is 
intensified in accordance with the ‘degree’ of AN or ‘risk’ of harm.  I have then 
edited more detailed guidance for the Management of Really Sick Patients with 
Anorexia Nervosa (MARSIPAN) published in 2010, which focuses on re-feeding 
practices within inpatient settings.   
The MARSIPAN guidance emerged in the context of the variability of the quality 
of provision for anorexia and concerns in relation to fatalities in general medical 
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settings and death from underfeeding syndrome.  The treatment guidelines were 
compiled by the MARSIPAN working group, a collaboration between the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists and Royal College of Physicians, with the hope that they 
would prevent unnecessary fatalities.  The authors of the MARSIPAN report, 
however, have claimed that “some fatalities are inevitable” because “[a]norexia 
nervosa has one of the highest mortalities of any psychiatric condition (RCP, 
2010, p. 10). 
Current NICE clinical guidance (2004) has stated that most people diagnosed 
with AN should be treated on an outpatient basis.  Inpatient treatment should be 
reserved for those who have not responded to outpatient treatment and those at 
substantial risk of suicide or self-harm.  When inpatient care is required, it should 
be offered within services with ‘skilled re-feeding’ and physical monitoring 
programmes, in combination with psychosocial interventions.  The authors of the 
NICE guidance have stated that they do not recommend pharmacological 
interventions as a sole or primary treatment for anorexia.  They acknowledge, 
however, that medication continues to be used in the treatment of AN for those 
with “comorbid conditions” and in order to “reduce high levels of anxiety” (p. 91).   
The aim of providing inpatient treatment is “to return body weight to a healthy 
level” (NICE 2004, p. 82).  The authors of the NICE guidance have stated that 
following re-feeding patients are “vulnerable to subsequent weight loss” and, 
therefore, “outpatient psychological treatments” should be "offered to prevent 
this” (p. 85).  They have noted that the provision of eating disorder services and 
models of service delivery within the UK vary and “range from ‘generic’, in which 
outpatient therapies are provided by community mental health teams, backed up 
by psychiatric admission, to variable models of specialist eating disorder 
services” (p. 31). As stated above, this diversity in service provision informed the 
development of the MARSIPAN guidelines, which were compiled by psychiatrists 
and physicians who claimed specialist expertise in managing and treating 
anorexia nervosa. 
Two MARSIPAN reports have been published; the original (RCP, 2010), which 
focused on adults, and more recently a junior MARSIPAN report (RCP, 2012), 
which focused specifically on children and young people up to the age of 18.  The 
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rationale for the separate reports included the different thresholds for risk and 
legal frameworks and the central role of paediatric services in the treatment of 
young people, which was related to the lack of specialist eating disorder units 
(SEDUs) in child and adolescent mental health services (RCP, 2012).   
The MARSIPAN guidance applies to “really sick patients” and the level of 
sickness is primarily defined in terms of body weight and those regarded to be at 
the “highest risk” (RCP, 2012, p. 14).  In the adult guidance, this refers to those 
with a BMI of less than 15 and individuals admitted to medical wards or to SEDUs 
(RCP, 2010).  For under 18s, “really sick” refers to those with “less that 70% 
median BMI for age and gender, for whom hospital admission is likely” (RCP, 
2012, p. 14).  Both documents have stated that these guidelines may also be 
applied to those with a BMI above the cut-off, but who have been losing weight 
rapidly, and those vomiting, using laxatives and/or over-exercising.  
Both MARSIPAN reports begin with issues of risk and risk assessment.  
Discussing the rationale for a comprehensive risk assessment, the adult 
guidance has stated that: 
Patients with anorexia nervosa can seem deceptively well. They 
may have an extremely powerful drive to exercise which sometimes 
seems to override their lack of nutritional reserve, so that they may 
appear very energetic right up to a physical collapse. One patient 
was seen to be going round a medical ward, cheerily waving to 
other patients through their windows just a few days before 
collapsing from fatal hypoglycaemia.  
       (RCP, 2010, p. 14) 
Similarly, the junior guidance emphasises the need to assess risk beyond a 
diagnostic assessment, because the symptomatology of young people may be 
different to adults and because they can appear more well than they are: 
Young children and pre-pubescent adolescents may present 
without the typical features (e.g. absent periods or significantly low 
BMI) found in adults, and the behaviours associated with eating 
disorders are often covert. The complexities of managing these 
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patients are compounded by the anxieties of the patient and their 
family, which also have an impact on the caring team. 
       (RCP, 2012, p. 16) 
A thorough risk assessment including clinical assessments and physical 
examinations is recommended, and frameworks are provided for assessing the 
level of risk in both sets of guidelines. The adult guidance has included a “basic 
list of observations to be made to assess risk [and whether inpatient care is 
required]” (RCP, 2010, p. 14), which I have reproduced in box 3.1.2.a below.  In 
contrast, the junior guidance has compiled a comprehensive risk assessment 
framework which “can be used to highlight areas useful to assess and grade 
concern, but is not a substitute for an overall experienced clinical assessment” 
(RCP, 2012, p. 16).  Due to limitations of space in this thesis this framework is 
reproduced in appendix F. 
Box 3.1.2.a. Risk assessment in anorexia nervosa22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
22
 Reproduced from the adult MARSIPAN guidance (RCP, 2010, p. 15). 
1. Body mass index: weight (kg)/height2 (m2) 
 anorexia <17.5 
 medium risk 13–15 
 high risk <13 
2. Physical examination 
 low pulse, blood pressure and core temperature 
 muscle power reduced 
 Sit up–Squat–Stand (SUSS) test 
3. Blood tests 
 sodium low: suspect water loading (<125 mmol/l high risk) 
 potassium low: vomiting or laxative abuse (<3 mmol/l high risk) 
Note: low sodium and potassium can occur in malnutrition with or without 
water loading or purging 
 raised transaminases 
 hypoglycaemia: blood glucose <3 mmol/l (if present, suspect occult infection, 
especially with low albumin or raised c-reactive protein) 
4. ECG 
 bradycardia 
 raised QTc (>450 ms) 
 non-specific T-wave changes 
 hypokalaemic changes  
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The authors of the junior guidelines have cautioned against prioritising clinical 
and physical assessments, which can help to rule out underlying pathology, at 
the expense of commencing re-feeding because, they have stated, this increases 
risk.  They have suggested that in “situations of diagnostic uncertainty, 
introducing calories will predictably elicit calorie-avoiding behaviour in those with 
a drive for thinness and fear of weight gain” (RCP, 2012, p. 17). 
When inpatient care is required, the adult MARSIPAN guidelines recommend that 
it should be provided in SEDU where possible.  For children and young people, 
the site of inpatient treatment will depend on the local services and could include 
a paediatric unit, a generic CAMHS inpatient unit or a SEDU for children and 
adolescents23.  Admissions can be voluntary for those who accept re-feeding 
treatment and compulsory for those who refuse although both guidelines stated 
that compulsory treatment should be a last resort.  For adults, “feeding is 
recognised as treatment for anorexia nervosa and can be done against the will of 
the patient as a life-saving measure” (RCP, 2010, p. 17) under Section 3 of the 
Mental Health Act (2007).  The junior guidelines have stated that children and 
young people under the age of 16 can be treated against their will if one parent 
consents to the treatment.  If the parents and child or young person refuse re-
feeding treatment, they have recommended that safeguarding procedures are 
followed and stated that the Children Act (2004) can be applied to those up to the 
age of 18.  In addition, the Mental Health Act (2007) can also be invoked for 
those aged between 16 and 18.   
The guidelines have stated that the preferred method of feeding for children and 
adults is oral.  However, if oral feeding fails to result in weight gain or the patient 
resists weight gain, then “nasogastric intubation and feeding may be necessary”, 
particularly “if poor nutritional intake is life threatening” (RCP, 2010, pp. 22-23).   
The authors of the first MARSIPAN guidance considered and debated the 
practices of re-feeding because of different concerns in relation to the individual’s 
health;  some physicians, for example, advocated beginning re-feeding slowly in 
                                            
23
 The authors have stated that there are only two SEDUs in the NHS and that the majority are in 
the private sector (RCP, 2012). 
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order to avoid re-feeding syndrome24, whereas primary concern for the 
psychiatrists was “to avoid further weight loss in a very underweight patient” (pp. 
23-24).  Following their discussions, the authors reached an agreement about the 
guidance in the management of weight gain and prevention of physical 
complications.  The recommended guidance is reproduced in box 3.1.2.b below.  
The management of re-feeding for children and young people is almost identical 
to the adult guidance (again due to limitations of space the junior guidance is 
included in appendix G). 
Box 3.1.2.b. Management of re-feeding25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alongside the nutritional guidance, which emphasised the importance of regularly 
monitoring and managing physical complications, the reports have stated that 
bed rest may be indicated for individuals who are “severely unwell” (RCP, 2012, 
p. 48).  The adult report recommended 24 hour bed rest for those with a BMI less 
than 13 and stated that bed rest may be introduced for those with a BMI of less 
than 15.  The junior guidelines have noted that “[e]nforced bed rest is extremely 
distressing for young people with anorexia nervosa unless they are robustly 
supported” and that it is, therefore, essential that some gentle activity, such as 
                                            
24
 Re-feeding syndrome refers to a range of electrolyte disturbances that can occur during re-
feeding.  In some cases “it can cause cardiac and respiratory failure, delirium and fits” (NICE 
2004, p. 101) 
25
 Reproduced from the adult MARSIPAN guidelines (RCP, 2010, p. 24). 
1. In eating disorder settings, a starting calorie intake of 20 kcal/kg/day appears to be 
safe.  However, electrolytes and clinical state need careful monitoring and transfer 
to a medical unit may be required if, for example, phosphate falls to <0.4 mmol/l. 
2. In medical in-patient settings it is sometimes prudent to use lower starting intakes 
(e.g. 5–10 kcal/kg/day), especially in the presence of severity indicators (Appendix 
5). 
3. If low initial calorie levels (5–15 kcal/kg/day) are used, clinical and biochemical 
review should be carried out twice daily, with calories increased in steps to 20 
kcal/kg/day within 2 days unless there is a contraindication. 
4. The decision to initiate low-calorie feeding should be made in consultation with an 
expert physician in clinical nutrition and a nutrition support team. Minor or even 
moderate abnormalities of liver function (e.g. alanine transaminase up to four 
times the upper limit of the normal range) should not delay increased feeding.  
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watching TV with others, reading a book, or doing some crafts, is available (RCP, 
2012, p. 49). 
Finally, the guidelines highlighted the behavioural challenges to re-feeding 
practices and the authors of the adult guidelines likened the “extreme compulsion 
to pursue thinness” to “addiction to heroin”.  They have stated that this leads 
patients to “take terrible risks” and that the persistence of these “behaviours may 
contribute to deterioration” and even “death” (p. 25). They listed the risks and 
deceptive behaviours and recommended vigilance by professionals.  The risks 
and behaviours included individuals drinking water before weighing; wearing 
weights or other items; gripping the weighing machine with their toes to appear 
heavier; engaging in “obsessive exercise”; wearing “very little clothing in order to 
shiver”; disposing of food; and vomiting (p. 25).   
The present case narrative, based on NICE and MARSIPAN guidelines, 
described above captures current guidance for the management of re-feeding 
practices for self-starving individuals diagnosed with anorexia nervosa.  In 
comparison to the historical case narrative, Dally and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) new 
treatment, current assessment and treatment practices related to re-feeding self-
starving individuals appear more technical and specialist.  Current guidance 
seems increasingly concerned with risk with different recommendations for 
treating those most and least at risk.  These and other transformations in 
practices will be explored further in the analysis of descent.  In addition to 
changes in practice, the case narratives also illustrate continuities, for example, 
the primary focus on weight gain and the use of bed rest.   
In section 3.3, the tracing of the descent of re-feeding practices, I will attempt to 
delineate the continuities, discontinuities and transformations in relation to 
Foucault’s conceptualisations of the technologies of the self and technologies of 
power using Rose’s five perspectival dimensions.  In the following section, the 
surface of emergence, I focus on mapping the diverse events and relations which 
made it possible for re-feeding to emerge as treatment for self-starving 
individuals. 
 
47 
 
3.2. Surface of Emergence 
In this section, I attempt to trace the conditions in which Dally and Sargant’s 
(1960; 1966) new treatment within a re-feeding regimen emerged in relation to 
the perspectival dimensions explicated in section 2.7. I begin the analysis by 
delineating the broader governmental strategies and problematizations, which 
created the conditions of possibility for psychiatry to emerge and mutate as a 
discipline.  Following this, I narrow the focus to map out the events and practices 
in which the new treatment emerged. 
3.2.1. Strategies and apparatus for public health 
As discussed in section 1.14.2 and appendix D.2 governmental strategies, by 
which I refer to the wider social, moral and political objectives and concerns 
about the desirable and undesirable conduct and features of the population in 
Western Europe, including the UK, have been imbricated in the way that 
individuals and populations are known and acted upon (Rose, 1996a).  In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the governmental strategies for improving 
the health, longevity and economic fitness of the nation’s citizens were focused 
on strategies for regulating hygiene and welfare and the strategy for eugenics 
(Rose, 1985; 2001).  Strategies for hygiene and welfare focused on the external 
conditions of health including clean water, a sufficient diet, satisfactory housing 
and domestic sanitation (Rose, 1985).  Eugenic programmes focused on 
classifying, identifying and constraining, or even eliminating, individuals in 
accordance with the goal of increasing the fitness of the nation (Rose, 2001). 
These strategies were intertwined with the continued shift away from visible and 
hierarchical forms of power to less visible strategies of exercising power that 
appeared separate from the state or sovereign (Foucault, 1977a).  Technologies 
of power, bodies of authority and expertise, emerged in the openings of space 
between governmental strategies of hygiene, welfare and eugenics and the 
changes in the way populations and individuals were governed.  Disciplinary 
authority and expertise became intertwined within networks of relations in which 
power-knowledge could be exercised in particular institutions and sites, which 
required the management and efficiency of citizens.  These sites and institutions 
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(for example, the factory, the school, the army, the prison), which were ostensibly 
distant from governmental strategies, created space for techniques and practices, 
such as observation, classification, reports and examinations, to emerge.  They 
created space for “the most mundane activities and thoughts” to be scrupulously 
recorded in order to create increasingly voluminous and detailed dossiers, which 
facilitated the comparison, differentiation and ranking of individuals (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 159).   
The expertise and authority accorded to professional disciplines compiling 
detailed dossiers, such as public health, demography, epidemiology, statistics, 
specialist medicine, psychiatry and psychology among others, emerged in 
relation to their effectiveness in developing dividing practices that could 
distinguish the healthy from the pathological, the normal from the abnormal and 
the mad from bad, for instance, in accordance with governmental strategies 
(Rose 1999; 2001).  Their authority and expertise were also intertwined with 
claims to particular types of knowledge (Foucault, 1977a).  Accordingly, dividing 
practices (for example, the examination and techniques of surveillance), 
underpinned by assumptions of homogeneity, resulted in the detailed “scientific” 
specification of individuals and the compilations of norms.  Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1982) have argued that the “sciences of man” emerged in relation to the growing 
and increasingly detailed specification and norms about individuals and 
populations, and conceptualised the modern individual as a fixed figure that could 
be objectified and analysed.   
Within the array of sites and institutions and in relation to the particular 
normalising techniques and dividing practices enacted by emergent professional 
disciplines, the individual and the collective body had become knowable.  The 
knowable individual and population had become governable in relation to 
concerns about hygiene, welfare and the fitness of the population.  These 
discursive practices, or techniques of objectification, marked an essential shift 
and growth of power.  Power, for instance, no longer visibly enacted by the 
sovereign or state, was exercised within its relation to knowledge and the 
individual (Foucault, 1977a).  
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3.2.2. The authority of science 
Problems in the nineteenth and twentieth century were located in the language of 
science (Rose, 1996a) and, therefore, required a scientific solution.  As already 
described, disciplines that claimed the status of science acquired the authority to 
judge, classify, problematize and manage individuals through techniques 
including surveillance, examination and normalising judgments.  Over time claims 
to science made it increasingly difficult to question norms and discourses; 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) have suggested that in Western society ‘scientific’ 
norms and discourses have become “almost sacred” and beyond questioning.     
Scientific practices associated with positivist or hypothetico-deductive 
philosophies assume that there is a natural and objective reality to be known, and 
are founded on the “empiricist assumption that ‘true’ knowledge must be 
grounded in experience and observation” (Malson, 1998, p. 35).  Positivist 
approaches, predicated on the assumption that the researched can be known 
independently of the researcher, lead to the adherence to particular research 
procedures, including measurement, quantification and statistical analysis 
alongside an emphasis on objectivity, reliability and replicability (Malson, 1998; 
Ussher, 2011).  Critiques of positivism, for example, by Popper and Kuhn have 
led to the emergence of post-positivist philosophies and approaches such as 
Kuhn’s paradigmatic view of the validity of science (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).  
Within the context of post-positivism, the philosophy and sociology of scientific 
activity and knowledge within the natural sciences has become increasingly 
examined and contested (Rose, 1999).  However, positivism continues to be 
dominant within the ‘psy’ disciplines; psychiatry, psychology and allied 
professions (Malson, 1998; Ussher, 2011), which has shaped and continues to 
delimit what can be authoritatively known about individuals and groups.  
3.2.3. Psychiatric Medicine: Strategies, Institutions and Problematized 
Individuals 
In the eighteenth century, pre-dating the governmental strategies for hygiene, 
welfare and eugenics, demography and associated disciplines emerged in the 
context of knowing, managing and caring for shifting populations that were 
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becoming condensed in urban areas due to industrialisation (Foucault, 1977a).  
The disciplinary technologies of demography and town planning, for example, 
were constituted in relation to, and constituted, notions of normal populations.  
The prison, the asylum and work houses among others emerged as sites for the 
non-normal or deviant (Foucault, 1977a).  During the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century, Vagrancy Laws were introduced and these laws gave local magistrates 
the authority to legitimately incarcerate the “furiously mad and dangerous” within 
asylums (Moncrieff, 2003, p. 8). 
The site of the asylum created possibilities for the mad and immoral to be made 
visible and the visible asylum made it possible for bodies or statements or 
discourses to be produced about its incarcerated inhabitants – it enabled power 
to operate as a double relation constituting knowledge and the subject (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999).  Initially administrated and managed by “alienists”, who were 
held in lowly regard (Porter, 1987), the asylum, and the strategies of hygiene and 
eugenics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, presented 
possibilities for the discipline of psychiatry to develop in relation to the need for 
techniques to manage the inmates of asylums (Porter, 2002).  The asylum and 
psychiatry, therefore, created spaces for disciplinary technologies to emerge.  
These disciplinary technologies were embedded within the network of broader 
strategies for managing the non-normal and deviant through techniques and 
practices that could produce docile citizens or docile bodies by identifying and 
administering the ‘the mad’, paupers and other ‘social deviants’ and removing 
them from society.  Psychiatry, as a disciplinary technology, grew into an 
authoritative and expert discipline in relation to legislative changes which required 
two medical certificates to detain people (Porter, 2002), the problematization of 
particular conduct, and through increasingly specified practices of classification 
and diagnosis, informed by a framework of positivist science (Rose, 1996a).   
The failure of psychiatry to cure or produce morally responsible self-governing, or 
docile, citizens, the growing public awareness about the conditions within 
asylums, and the strategic shift to the neo-hygienic strategies for public health, in 
the early to mid-twentieth century, created new possibilities for the discipline of 
psychiatry.  For example, the management of the “insane” extended beyond state 
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controlled practices of incarcerating those with mental disorders within asylums 
(Moncrieff, 2003) to programmes associated with the neo-hygienic strategies of 
health (Rose, 1985).   
The broadening out of the governmental strategies of physical hygiene, welfare 
and eugenics, which had focused on external programmes of knowledge and 
administration to include neo-hygienic strategies for public health, marked a shift 
from technologies of power to technologies of the self.  The neo-hygienic 
strategies for public health were embedded within changes to state intervention 
and social welfare and the increasing coordination between preventative and 
individualised medicine and autonomous individuals (Moncrieff, 2003; Rose, 
1985; 1996b).  Within this network of relations, programmes of mental hygiene 
emerged in the UK, and the US and France, in the 1920s and 1930s, with the 
intention of inventing “a more positive and social vocation for psychiatry” (Rose, 
1996a, p. 9).  This new vocation, within the context of preventative and 
individualised medicine, indicated a more active role for psychiatry in the 
detection and management of milder and potentially curable mental disorders 
(Rose, 1985).   
3.2.4. Neo-hygienic strategies and technologies of medicine 
According to Rose (1985) “[t]he key move in the new strategy of mental hygiene 
was to establish the continuity of disorders of mind and body and hence extend to 
the former the new preventative and therapeutic techniques which had worked 
well for the latter” (p. 160).  The stigma of lunacy and infringements of liberty 
associated with compulsory and long-term internment, barriers to the new 
preventative and therapeutic techniques, which encouraged help seeking by 
those with milder or neurotic problems, were targeted through revised policy and 
legislation (Rose, 1985) and mutations in psychiatric practices and institutions of 
medicine and “mental medicine” during the early-to-mid-twentieth century. 
In the late 1920s in the UK, the Macmillan Commission was formed to review the 
detention of people who were of “unsound mind” and “treatment without 
certification for people without a mental disorder” (Coppock & Dunn, 2010, p. 31).  
The Macmillan Commission endorsed the medical model of mental disorder, 
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stating that ‘[t]here is no clear line of demarcation between mental and physical 
illness’ (Royal Commission, 1926, cited by Moncrieff, 2003, p. 8), and shaped 
changes in legislation.  In 1930, following the Macmillan Commission’s 
recommendation, the 1930 Mental Treatment Act (MTA) replaced the Lunacy Act 
1890.  The terminology in the MTA was revised: “mental illness” replaced 
“lunacy”; “mental hospital” or “hospital” replaced “asylum”, and two new 
categories of treatment and patients: “voluntary” and “out-patient”, were 
introduced (Coppock & Dunn, 2010; Turner, Deahl & Salter, 1999).   
The strategy of mental hygiene also related to the shift towards general hospitals 
as sites for the new “mental medicine” because they could reach “patients, ex-
patients and potential patients” (Rose, 1985, p. 161).   
The Mental Health Act (MHA) 1959 marked further shifts in terms of sanctioning 
medical approaches to mental illness (Ramsay & Holloway, 2007).  Compulsory 
detention and treatment moved away from legal practices and became “an 
essentially medical decision” (Turner, Deahl & Salter, 1999, p. 578).  The 
authority for detention became based on the judgement of two registered medical 
practitioners (Ramsay & Holloway, 2007) that the person was “suffering from 
mental disorder” and that it was “necessary in the interests of the patient’s health 
or safety or for the protection of other persons that the patient should be so 
detained” (MHA, 1959, p. 16). 
In addition to legal and policy changes in relation to mental disorders, broader 
strategies for state intervention and social welfare led to the formation of the 
National Health Service (NHS) in 1948.  Its objective was to provide “universal, 
comprehensive and free health care” and ultimate responsibility for the provision 
and quality of the care resided “in the minister appointed by the governing party” 
(Gorsky, 2008, p. 438).  For some the formation of NHS was “an incarnation of 
social solidarity and distributional justice” and for others it represented “inflexible 
bureaucracy and paternalism” (Gorsky, 2008, p. 438).  Within the neo-hygienic 
strategies of public health, the NHS became a key apparatus for disciplinary 
technologies of others and the subjectification of oneself; for example, through 
medical professionals’ expertise in relation to health and illness, inculcating the 
self through preventative practices for maintaining health and preventing disease, 
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and social responsibility to others in terms of making National Insurance 
contributions through one’s working wage.  The political and physical institution of 
the NHS also created space for psychiatry and other ‘psy’ disciplines to 
authenticate their authority and expertise, while creating a medium through which 
practices and sites of medicine could become increasingly governed. 
3.2.5. Practices and techniques of psychiatric medicine 
The legislative and policy shifts increased the distance and invisibility of 
governmental power, and power was increasingly exercised through strategies 
for extending the practices and techniques of medicine, to govern the minds and 
bodies of the unwell and the well.  Psychiatry’s status and authority as a medical 
discipline, and its new social vocation to cure and not just administer those 
diagnosed with mental illnesses, created a context for new physical treatments to 
emerge (Rose, 1985).  
In the 1930s, biological psychiatry’s repertoire of technologies in the asylums 
mutated from the classification and management of the mad to include physical 
therapies such as psychosurgery (leucotomy, later known as lobotomy), ECT and 
insulin coma therapy (Moncrieff, 2009; Roche, 2010).  Sedatives were also widely 
used, but their role was seen primarily as a “chemical restraint”, not as aid to 
treatment or a cure (Moncrieff, 2009, p. 2).  It has been claimed that the 
popularity of physical practices was associated with the “demonstrable 
improvements in patients, after a period of falling recovery rates in asylums” 
(Roche, 2010, pp. 71-72).  In contrast, Whitaker (2010) has argued that it was 
well known by those practising psychosurgery that it led to profound changes in 
people who became more “lethargic, disinterested and childlike”, rather than 
cured (p. 49).  Physical treatments, however, helped to shore up psychiatry’s 
expertise and authority within the network of governmental strategies.   
William Sargant’s career in psychiatry began in the mid-1930s at the time when 
physical therapies were emerging and psychiatry’s authority and reach was 
growing.   Sargant reportedly stated that the mentally disordered “could not 
benefit from psychotherapy and that physical therapies were first required to 
restore normal brain” (Roche, 2010, p. 72).  Sargant’s view was shared within 
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and outside of psychiatry, in the UK and overseas, perhaps demonstrated by the 
Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1949 being awarded to the Portuguese neurologist, 
Egas Moniz, had who introduced the practice of leucotomy (Whitaker, 2010, p. 
49).  Although psychosurgery and other physical interventions failed to cure 
madness, they extended the disciplinary techniques of psychiatry beyond 
classification and administration to expert management and treatment, which 
produced more docile patients. 
Although sedatives were already in use in asylums and mental hospital 
(Moncrieff, 2009), in the middle of the twentieth century, drugs with psychoactive 
effects became known as new techniques within psychiatry’s repertoire.  
Psychiatry’s drug treatments emerged in the context of the search for medicines 
that could treat infectious diseases following the development of medicinal doses 
of penicillin during the Second World War (Whitaker, 2010).  The calming effects 
of some compounds on the mental and physical states of surgical patients led to 
the use of drugs in psychiatric contexts.  In 1952, two prominent French 
psychiatrists published articles describing the effects of chlorpromazine on 
“psychotic patients”:  
“Seated or lying down, the patient is motionless in bed, often pale 
and with lowered eyelids. (…) If questioned, he responds after a 
delay, slowly, in an indifferent monotone, expressing himself with 
few words and quickly becoming mute. (…)”  
(Delay and Deniker, cited in Whitaker, 2010, p. 50). 
Chlorpromazine, a major tranquiliser, worked by decreasing activity of the central 
nervous system leading to the inhibition of mental and physical activity (Moncrieff, 
2009).  It was marketed as a great discovery and was enthusiastically received 
within biological psychiatry (Moncrieff, 2009), which had become increasingly 
popular in relation to psychiatry’s strategic alignment with medicine.  In North 
America, where many psychiatrists continued to be psychoanalytically oriented, 
Smith Kline and French, the manufacturers, marketed chlorpromazine more 
cautiously:  
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“there is no thought that chlorpromazine is a cure for mental illness, 
but it can have great value if it relaxes patients and makes them 
accessible to treatment”  
(Time Magazine, 1954, cited in Whitaker, 2010, pp. 59-60)   
Chlorpromazine and other drugs emerged during a period when psychiatry was 
failing to cure madness in the asylums, asylums were being viewed as expensive 
institutions (Moncrieff, 2009), asylums and physical treatments were increasingly 
criticised (Rose, 1985), policies were encouraging voluntary and outpatient 
treatment (Coppock & Dunn, 2010), and when broader strategies for public health 
were targeting prevention and intervention at the level of the autonomous 
individual (Rose, 1985; 1996a). It has been argued that psychiatry was 
transformed by the success of the new drugs to relieve symptoms of mental 
illness, which the led to the increasing use of psychopharmacological medication 
(Roche, 2010).  Psychiatry was perhaps transformed because its new 
technologies could shape conduct and be administered to large numbers while 
being cost-effective. It provided a method of governing at a distance, in 
accordance with the overarching political strategies, under the auspice of 
medicine. 
Initially chlorpromazine was mainly administered to patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.   Psychiatry claimed that, like physical medicine, it had drugs that 
could be prescribed for their patients and treat ‘diseases’ (Whitaker, 2010), 
however, chlorpromazine and other drugs did not treat ‘underlying pathology’ 
(Moncrieff, 2009).  In addition to sedating patients, chlorpromazine produced 
numerous unpleasant and even deleterious effects, particularly at higher doses. 
These effects, commonly referred to as side-effects, included rigidity of muscles 
(acute dystonic reaction), a state of restlessness (akathisia), irregular heartbeat 
or arrhythmias, metabolic disruption causing weight gain, hormonal changes and 
dry mouth, blurred vision and constipation (Moncrieff, 2009).  These effects were 
initially considered to be “signs that the drugs were working, and hence markers 
of a therapeutic reaction” (Rose, 2003, pp. 49). 
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3.2.6. Psychiatric techniques for re-feeding self-starving individuals 
Increasingly, physical methods became marketed as treating the underlying 
disorder (Moncrieff, 2009; Whitaker, 2010).  Dally and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) use 
of modified insulin therapy (MIT) and chlorpromazine in relation to re-feeding 
practices, however, were not explained as acting on underlying pathology but 
described as methods to overcome the individual’s resistance to eating and fear 
of gaining weight.  
The use of physical methods in Dally and Sargant’s (1960) new treatment 
emerged in relation to the concerns about deaths among patients treated for AN 
reported in a recent study, increasing pessimism about the long-term outcome of 
current treatments, and claims that tube feeding (a technique associated with the 
general physician) was “undesirable from a psychological point of view” (p. 1770).  
The use of the techniques for ‘treating’ self-starving individuals also emerged in 
relation to increasingly dominant discourses within biological psychiatry that 
mental disorders were brain disorders and the view that AN was caused by “a 
morbid mental state”, which meant that “the inclinations of the patient must be in 
no way consulted” (Gull, 1874, cited in Dally & Sargant, 1960, p. 1770).  These 
discourses, intertwined with practices that prioritised psychiatric 
conceptualisations, silenced the individual or other perspectives and marginalised 
the role of psychotherapy. 
In contrast to the increasing pessimism and critique of general medicine’s use of 
tube feeding, MIT (also known as sub-coma therapy) and chlorpromazine 
(psychopharmacology) induced rapid weight gain and shifted expertise and 
authority in relation to self-starving individuals from the domain of the general 
physician to biological psychiatry.  The rapid weight gain, however, was not a 
result of reversing the brain disorder but a consequence of the fact that heavily 
sedated and docile patients could be compliantly re-fed.  MIT, for instance, 
resulted in “physiological – essentially vegetative – changes” and produced a 
sub-coma state (Tyndel, 1956, p. 565) and chlorpromazine was a major 
tranquilizer which inhibited anxiety in relation to eating. 
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The achievement of the physical techniques to induce eating behaviours and 
weight gain in emaciated individuals signalled psychiatry’s expertise at saving 
lives and restoring normal appearance (Russell, 2006) or, in other words, 
psychiatry’s ability to shape conduct.  The unpleasant and even harmful effects of 
the physical treatments, for example, signs of Parkinsonism and grand mal 
seizures associated with high doses of chlorpromazine, or ECT and modified 
leucotomy, were silenced in the face of discourses about the risk of prolonged 
inanition.   The practices of re-feeding were authorised by their life saving 
function – within the strategies of bio-power everyone has the “right to life” 
(Foucault, 1979b).  For the self-starving person who had lost sight of her vital 
norms, the psychiatrist could authoritatively intervene though legal powers for 
compulsory treatment under the MHA 1959.   
Weight loss following treatment (i.e. failure to apply the techniques of 
subjectification to oneself after being discharged) resulted in patients being 
readmitted and retreated with chlorpromazine and insulin.  Weight gain and the 
associated physical normalcy were central to the techniques of physical 
treatments.  The longer-term effects of these physical treatments were less 
impressive and, it could be argued, positioned as less important.   
Roche (2010) has stated that, in general, Dally and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) 
papers were well received and, according to Russell (2006), they indicated that 
the treatment of AN could be handled predominately by psychiatry (Russell, 
2006).  In 1966, the year Dally and Sargant’s follow-up paper was published, 
Kidd and Wood, in the BMJ’s Postgraduate Medical Journal, stated that Dally and 
Sargant’s chlorpromazine and modified insulin therapy was a widely used 
treatment for anorexia.  
It is worth noting that in the 1960s, the period when Dally and Sargant reported 
on their new treatment in the BMJ, the anti-psychiatry movement was emerging 
(Roche, 2010).  The anti-psychiatry movement was a high profile social and 
political movement which contested psychiatric diagnoses and criticised the 
asylum and practices of leucotomy and ECT on ethical, moral and political 
grounds in the 1960 and 1970s (Porter, 2002).  It was associated with 
58 
 
psychiatrists such as Laing and Szasz26 and philosophers and social critics, such 
as Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari.  Within the anti-psychiatry movement, there 
was general agreement that psychiatry’s authority was unfounded and unethical 
but the work of Laing (1960), Szasz (1960) and Foucault (1967a), for example, 
approached the discipline of psychiatry and dominant conceptualisations of 
madness in different ways.   
3.2.7. Authority in relation to techniques of classification 
As discussed above, the authority of psychiatry, as a discipline to administer and 
manage individuals, emerged within the context of strategies for governing and 
creating self-governing subjects at a distance.  Psychiatry’s alignment with 
physical medicine in relation to neo-hygienic strategies, and its attempts to 
emulate the practices of science, created a space for formal classificatory 
systems. 
The less technical dividing practices of identifying and segregating the normal 
from abnormal, the mad from the bad, or the psychotic from the neurotic, became 
more technical and elaborate through practices of classification to produce 
taxonomies of madness.  During the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of 
classificatory systems were compiled and employed by psychiatrists in Europe 
and North America (Zilboorg & Henry, 1941).  Emile Kraepelin, for example, 
published the Compendium, which grouped together mental illnesses considered 
to have a poor outcome in the latter part of the nineteenth century.   Psychiatrists 
such as Kraepelin worked within a natural view of madness, which led to the 
assumption that a finite number of categories of mental disorders with distinct 
psychopathology, aetiology, course and outcome would eventually be discovered 
(Bentall, 2003; 2010; Boyle, 2002).   
It was during the middle of the twentieth century that the competing and multiple 
systems were displaced by an accepted taxonomical system produced by an 
organisation of psychiatrists in North America, the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA), which was positioned as the authoritative account that 
provided a more rigorous and reliable tool for diagnosing mental disorders.  The 
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 It should be noted that neither Laing nor Szasz referred to themselves as anti-psychiatrists. 
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authoritative classificatory system also emerged in the context of private health 
systems, which required diagnoses for treatment practices to be financed (Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1999).  The first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Diseases (DSM) 27 (APA, 1952), or “psychiatric bible”, contained a 
detailed description and symptom checklist for 94 categories of “mental disorder” 
(Kirk & Kutchins, 1999).  Anorexia Nervosa was not among the 94 categories. 
At the time of Dally and Sargant’s publication of their new treatment in 1960, 
therefore, anorexia nervosa, as a dividing practice, was not within the web of 
authority and expertise of psychiatry.  Sixteen years later, when the second 
edition of the DSM was published, and eight years after their first paper was 
published, AN was still not included within the authoritative nosology of mental 
disorders.  Its absence perhaps reflected the differing opinions about its status as 
a mental disorder, and ideas that the symptoms were merely features of another 
psychiatric disorder.  Kay and Leigh (1954), for example, (see section 3.1.1), had 
suggested that anorexia nervosa was not a distinct syndrome and that the 
symptoms were associated with other disorders, such as “depressive mood”:  
The psychiatric symptomatology is diverse. There is no neurosis 
specific to anorexia nervosa, and no specific anorexia nervosa. We 
are not convinced that we have been dealing with a psychiatric 
entity. 
Kay and Leigh (1954, p. 411) 
Noticably Kay and Leigh’s research was not openly28 referred to in Dally 
and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) publications.  Nor was there reference to the 
period when the diagnosis of AN fell into disuse (see section 3.3.3).  Dally 
and Sargant (1960) presented AN as a specific “syndrome” with a long 
history, evidenced in their reference to Gull first describing in 1874 AN and 
“recognising” that the refusal to eat was due to the individual’s “morbid 
mental state” (p. 1770).  Dally and Sargant’s articles were published in the 
                                            
27
 The DSM became an international system and was used broadly in psychiatric research.  It 
also influenced the criteria for mental disorders in the International Classification of Diseases 
published by the World Health Organisation [WHO].   
28
 In section 3.1.1 I have noted that they refer to some of their research findings without 
referencing the paper, which would mean they were aware of their view.  
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British Medical Journal which, along with the Lancet, was a well-
established medical journal in the UK. 
The authority of syndrome and nosological systems, however, was central to the 
psychiatrist’s work and Dally and Sargant’s account of the diagnostic criteria for 
AN emerged within this context.  Drawing on Gull’s description and referring to 
detailed “psychiatric and endocrinology studies”, Dally and Sargant (1960) set out 
the “essential criteria” used to diagnose anorexia nervosa in their study.  The four 
criteria were refusal to eat, severe weight loss, amenorrhea and the absence of 
another serious condition (p. 1770).   
In overlooking the discontinuities in the history of the diagnosis of anorexia 
nervosa, for example, excluding Kay and Leigh’s (1954) research and ignoring 
AN’s recent re-emergence after a long absence, Dally and Sargant constructed a 
discourse of continuity in relation to AN as a mental disorder (p. 1770).  The 
publication of their account within an esteemed journal, which had the potential to 
reach a broad base of general physicians and psychiatrists, and the dominance 
of authoritative systems to administer mental disorders, provided a network to 
validate Dally and Sargant’s expertise and authority in relation to diagnosing and 
managing self-starving individuals with the technical practices available within 
psychiatry.  The diagnosed self-starving individual, who had failed to appear and 
act in accordance with norms of weight and diet, became imbricated within the 
technologies of power and technologies of the self of the thoroughly medical – 
physical and psychiatric – individual. 
3.2.8. The family and technologies of subjectification 
As described in section 3.2.3, the neo-hygienist strategies in the inter-war period 
of early to mid-twentieth century led to increasing coordination between 
preventative and individualised medicine, which marked shift from a dependence 
on external practices of health and hygiene to the inclusion of strategies for 
inculcating self-governing autonomous, and morally responsible, individuals 
(Rose, 1985).  Individuals became liberated to the extent “that they had taken the 
obligations of moral, prudent and self-responsible conduct into themselves” 
(Rose, 1996a, p. 7), or that they were a docile body.  The obligations of the 
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autonomous individual were in the context of their relations and commitments to 
the family and community (Rose, 1985; 1996b). 
The family, as an extension of the state, emerged as an important apparatus for 
shaping the health and well-being of its citizens.  In addition to maximising 
conditions of physical health and hygiene, the family became a site for 
constituting socially and morally responsible children and adults.  The family was 
also a locale for creating psychologically healthy individuals as “[p]ersonal 
happiness and social adjustment” became constructed as “two sides of the same 
coin” (Rose, 1985, p. 186).  An autonomous liberated individual was 
concomitantly a happy individual, and the “natural family” became the obvious 
apparatus “for the child’s normal and healthy development” (Rose, 1985, p. 176).   
Within this context, malfunctioning families became implicated, alongside 
physical illness and organic mental illness, as aetiological explanations of 
“troubled children”, social inefficiency, and adult mental disorders, for example 
the double-bind theory (Bateson, Jackson, Hayley, & Weakland, 1956).   The 
family, an increasingly important apparatus in relation to constituting 
subjectivities, became a site for preventative intervention.    
Child Guidance Clinics (CGC)29 emerged as apparatus for administering 
expertise and authority in relation to the family, childhood and associated 
problems (Rose, 1985).  It was within the context of working with families at the 
CGC – the relay between broader moral, social and political rationalities and the 
role of the family – that psychological theories of development emerged in the 
middle of the twentieth century.  These psychological theories stressed the 
importance of early object relations between the primary care giver and child in 
relation to the child’s physical and mental well-being (Rose, 1985).  Within the 
family, the mother-child relationship became a particularly important site for 
administering and managing strategies for health and hygiene.   
Rose (1985) has argued that these theories about familial relationships affecting 
the subjectivities of its members emerged within the network of relations between 
the strategies and authoritative knowledges and practices about the individual, 
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 The first demonstration CGC in UK opened in Islington in 1928 (Rose, 1985, p. 209). 
62 
 
the family and the community.  They did not just emerge to legitimate the re-
domestication of women following the Second World War. 
As described above, the family had become an apparatus for subjectifying 
practices in terms of how to conduct oneself as a parent and family member and 
for instilling physical and psychological health and socially productive habits.  The 
family was not an independent site of power but intertwined with local and more 
distant technologies in relation to child rearing, which were exercised through 
CGC, parenting manuals, and discourses about raising healthy children (Rose, 
1985).  The shaping of the private self had been distanced from state practices, 
while political strategies were imbricated in their daily lives.  If individuals failed to 
manage themselves accordingly, the family and professionals in the community 
could intervene. 
Self-starving individuals, through psychiatric technologies, have been 
conceptualised as problematic in relation to healthy and socially productive 
habits.  The self-starving individual, however, does not typically conceptualise 
their food practices and physical appearance as problematic – it is normally 
concerned family members or friends who bring the person to the attention of a 
doctor (Garfinkel & Garner, 1982).  Although the family has not succeeded in 
instilling the desired habits, its relation to discourses of physical and mental 
health enabled the family to assess the self-starving family member in 
accordance with normative standards and bring her30 into contact with expert and 
authoritative technicians.   
The family had also become a site of health or dysfunction in relation to the 
child’s current and future mental health; this was not a new idea, in 1888 Charcot 
had argued: 
In order to properly treat a hysterical girl, one must not leave her 
with her father and mother; she needs to be placed in a mental 
hospital. 
(cited in Foucault, 1979b, p. 112).   
                                            
30
 A female pronoun has been used because diagnoses of anorexia nervosa have overwhelmingly 
been applied to females (see section 1.17).  In The Madness of Women, Ussher (2007) argued – 
more generally – that for centuries women outnumbered men in “diagnoses of madness” (p. 1). 
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In Dally and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) new treatment, self-starving individuals were 
hospitalised and separated from their families; typical practice among 
psychiatrists and general physicians administering re-feeding treatments (Kay & 
Leigh, 1954; Goren & Feldman-Toledano, 1966).  Although Dally and Sargant 
(1960) quoted Gull (1874) as saying that “patients should be fed at regular 
intervals and surrounded by people who would have moral control over them; 
relatives and friends being generally the worst attendants” (p. 1770), they did not 
discuss the family as a site of dysfunction.    In contrast, in an article in the British 
Journal of Psychiatry, Goren and Feldman-Toledano (1966), a head physician 
and head nurse, explicitly drew on discourses of family dysfunction in their 
conceptualisation of anorexia nervosa and approach to treatment. They argued 
that food-refusing patients were “love deprived” and, therefore, re-feeding should 
take place within the context of acting as “substitute parents” to address the “love 
deficiency” (p. 673), alongside a programme of educating parents and not 
discharging patients directly to their family homes after they had gained weight. 
The family was, thus, both implicated in the dysfunction, according to 
psychological theories, and pivotal to intervening on the self-starving individual by 
bringing them into contact with professionals for assessment and management. 
3.2.9. Making up people through medicine 
Medicine, ranging from clinical medicine to health promotion, was imbricated with 
the new strategies for governing populations and individuals (Rose, 2007).  Rose 
(1994; 2007) has suggested that in developed countries, since at least the 
eighteenth century, medicine, which was perhaps the first positivist knowledge to 
take the form of expertise, “has played a constitutive part in ‘making up people’” 
(Rose, 2007a, p. 700).  Its authority to make up and act upon people stemmed 
from its claims to scientificity.  Since the eighteenth century, medical expertise 
and authority, in terms of separating and dividing the person in relation to his or 
her vitality within a framework of positive knowledge, became intertwined in our 
experiences and understanding of being human and defining health and 
pathology (Rose, 1994).   
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According to Canguilhem (1943), Foucault’s PhD supervisor and mentor, 
knowledge of ‘vital norms' within medicine were constituted in relation to the 
normativity of the body:  
It is life itself, and not medical judgement, which makes the 
biological normal a concept of value and not a concept of statistical 
reality (…) Health lies in the silence of the organs. 
       (cited in Rose, 1985, p. 226) 
In The Birth of the Clinic, however, Foucault (1973) drew attention to the 
temporality and contingency in the ways in which disease and illness had been 
configured and localised on the body:  
“For us, the human body defines, by natural right, the space of 
origin and of distribution of disease: a space whose lines, volumes, 
surfaces and routes are laid down, in accordance with a now 
familiar geometry, by the anatomical atlas.  But this order of the 
solid, visible body is only one way – in all likelihood neither the first, 
nor the most fundamental – in which one spatializes disease.  
There have been, and will be, other distributions”  
        (Foucault, 1973, p. 3). 
Rose (1996) has suggested that it would be an oversimplification or “an 
epistemological shortcut” to say that vital norms in medical discourse and 
practices solely derive from the biological normal.  For example, certain 
conditions have made it possible for normative ideas about health and disease to 
emerge and “some people are more medically made up than others — women 
more than men, the wealthy differently from the poor, children more than adults, 
and, of course, differently in different countries and regions of the world” (Rose, 
2007a, p. 700).   
3.2.10. The subjectification of the pathologised female 
Feminists such as Ussher (1991; 2011) and Liebert (2010) have analysed the 
more medically made up female body and argued that vital norms, and other 
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medical discourses and practices, are gendered.  Constituting the molar body, for 
example, in terms of the male body, others and pathologises the female body.  
Norms relating to the female body centre on its reproductive function.   
The hormonal discourse constructs women as biologically and 
innately inferior, if not dangerous (…) In this way it naturalizes 
patriarchal authority, and the institutions (such as heterosexual 
marriage, heteronormativity, house-wifery and protectionist sex 
‘education’) that bring this into being (Liebert, 2010, p. 278). 
The hormonal body is a concern in Dally and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) research 
with amenorrhea included as a primary symptom for diagnosing AN.  The vital 
norms of the self-starving individual’s body were associated with a return to a 
reproductive body: “they retained their weight” and “they resumed menstruation” 
(Dally & Sargant, 1966, p. 6).  Marrying and becoming pregnant, which Liebert 
has suggested are roles defined by patriarchal institutions, were also associated 
with doing “extremely well following the weight gain” (Dally & Sargant, 1966, p. 
6).  In addition, in discussing the long-term outcomes for the individuals 
diagnosed with AN, Dally and Sargant (1966) have suggested that the majority 
“are backward in the psychosexual development” but that they “are able to marry 
and have children” (p. 795). Heterosexual marriage, heteronormativity and 
house-wifery are constituted as important goals in assessing the “recovery” or 
return to roles within the broader strategies of the family, community and society. 
Self-starving women who consult physicians tend to come “because of 
amenorrhea or infertility” and others may “present to sexual dysfunction clinics 
with vaginismus and frigidity” (Garfinkel & Garner, 1982, pp. 15-16).  The above 
quote suggests that self-starving females who seek professional help do so 
because they have come to understand and act upon themselves as thoroughly 
medicalised and dysfunctional bodies in relation to their responsibilities to bear 
healthy children and safeguard the family institution and society (Foucault, 
1979b). 
In this chapter, I have delineated a number of the conditions in which Dally and 
Sargant’s new treatment aimed at re-feeding the self-starving body emerged.  In 
66 
 
the following chapter, comparing historical and current practices, I consider the 
ways in which strategies, apparatus and techniques, for instance, have mutated 
of stayed the same in the last fifty years. 
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3.3. Descent 
In this section, I analyse the practices of re-feeding, as set out in the present 
case narrative, and contrast it with Dally and Sargant’s new treatment.  I explicate 
the perspectival dimensions through an exploration of different ‘events’ implicated 
in current re-feeding practices to delineate the continuities, discontinuities and 
mutations between 1960 and the present.  I produced a map of descent - a 
‘dispositif’ - to highlight the heterogeneous network of relations and events in 
which re-feeding practices for self-starving individuals are possible (appendix H).  
Within the constraints of this professional doctorate thesis, a limited number of 
events are examined, namely, contemporary bio-political strategies, documentary 
apparatus, technologies of diagnosis, psychiatric techniques, impatient and 
community apparatuses and the administration of life saving measures.  I could 
equally have focused on any of the other events mapped within the dispositif.   
3.3.1. Contemporary bio-political strategies and apparatus 
In Britain, following the Second World War, there was an expansion of state 
apparatus and strategies associated with maximising social welfare in order to 
secure economic well-being (Rose, 1996a; 1999).  Rose (1996a; 2001) argued 
that towards the latter half of the twentieth century, ‘advanced liberal’31 forms of 
government emerged, supplanting strategies of social welfare, in a “market 
constituted largely by private enterprises” (Rose, 1996a, p. 337).  In addition to 
the earlier neo-hygienic strategies of health and well-being, which sought prudent 
and self-responsible bodies through medicine, education and domesticity to 
secure the fitness of the population, new strategies centred on techniques in 
which individual anxieties and aspirations for health and well-being were 
interwoven (Rose, 2001).   In accordance with advanced liberal strategies of 
government and bio-political contexts of administering life (see section 1.15.3), 
individuals and families became inculcated to conceptualise themselves as the 
key players in shaping their biological lives and hopes for the future (Rose, 
2007b). 
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 “Perhaps one could say that the general strategic field of all of those programs of government 
that regard themselves as liberal has been defined by the problem of how free individuals can be 
governed such that they enact their freedom appropriately” (Rose, 1996a, p. 29). 
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While the state continues to be responsible for securing external conditions of 
health, it has worked to distance itself from some of its responsibilities in relation 
to illness and accidents.  The health of the nation is reconfigured in moral, ethical 
and economic terms in relation to the conduct of autonomous free individuals and 
an enabling and facilitating state (Rose, 2001) 
Within these contexts, the subjectivity of the self-starving individual has been 
problematized with increasing specificity and in different ways.  In the following 
sections I examine the shifts, continuities and discontinuities in relation to the 
administration and management of re-feeding practices. 
3.3.2. A growth in documentary apparatus and self-starving bodies 
Since the re-assertion of psychiatry as the authority and expertise for 
administering and managing self-starving bodies in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
period of Dally and Sargant’s papers, there has been an explosion in the 
documentary apparatus, or commentaries, relating to the self-starved body and 
AN populations.  As figure 3.3.2a illustrates, publications relating to AN32 doubled 
in the decade that followed the re-emergence of anorexia (see section 3.3.3).  
Between the 1970s and the 1980s, the volume of published literature quintupled 
– it is worth noting that The International Journal of Eating Disorders was 
launched in 1981 – and appears to have continued to grow exponentially since 
then.   
Concomitantly, it has been argued that the incidence of diagnosing AN has 
increased dramatically in Western cultures (Bruch, 1973; Hsu, 1989). Russell 
(1977) suggested that the increasing number of publications could perhaps be 
attributed to anorexia becoming more recognised in recent years or an actual 
increase in its incidence.  Whether the incidence of anorexia has mirrored the 
growth of the documentary apparatus, however, has been debated.  
Conglomerating different European studies, which had used different 
methodologies, Hoek argued that there had been “an upward trend” in the 
incidence of diagnoses of AN until the 1970s, after which incidence rates 
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 Using the same databases as the literature search (see appendix A) 
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remained stable (Hoek, 2006; van Hoeken, Seidell & Hoek, 2003).  Hoek’s 
summary of analysis is reproduced in figure 3.3.2.b. 
Figure 3.3.2.a. Search results for anorexia nervosa (1885 - 2013) 
 
Figure 3.3.2.b. Registered yearly incidence of AN in mental healthcare in 
northern Europe in the 20th century  
  
        Hospital records, Sweden;      case register, north-east Scotland; 
        mental healthcare, the Netherlands. 
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Increasing volumes and more detailed documentary apparatuses are within the 
network of relations that ‘black box’ the problematization of self-starvation as AN.  
For example, epidemiology statistics have been criticised for ‘merely “counting 
what psychiatric agencies do” (Smith, 1990, p. 117), and, in the process, shoring 
up the ‘truth’ status of anorexia and strengthening the authority and expertise of 
psychiatric technologies, despite the lack of progress in relation to ‘cure’ or 
‘recovery’.   
In the 1970s and 1980s, in contrast to the psycho-medical problematization of 
self-starvation, critical feminists, commenting on the emergence of anorexia into 
the public consciousness, argued that ‘the anorexic boom’ coincided with 
increasing feminist activism, which perhaps suggested that self-starvation was 
related to the context and lives of middle class women in Western countries, 
rather than a psychiatric illness (MacSween, 1993).  In addition to the growth of 
academic and clinical literature relating to AN since the 1980s, there has been an 
increase in commentaries critiquing psychiatric conceptualizations of self-
starvation for de-politicising, de-contextualising and mis-labelling women’s 
distress (e.g. Bordo,1993; Chernin, 1986; Hepworth, 1999; Orbach, 1986; 
Ussher, 1991).  Critical and postmodern analyses, which have offered alternative 
frameworks for conceptualising self-starvation, however, appear to have been 
limited in the extent to which they have infiltrated broader understandings of 
clinical practice.  This could perhaps be understood within the network of 
relations that work to authenticate medico-psychiatric problematizations and 
delimit what can be said and what counts as knowledge.  For example, reviews of 
The Social Construction of Anorexia (Hepworth, 1999), suggested that the book 
“is likely to be viewed … as an idle intellectual excursion offering little of practical 
value, especially when … faced with self-starving people who are likely to die 
without significant interventions” (Holmes, 2001, p. 210) or for professionals who 
“seek a critical perspective on their own practices” (Toon, 2001, p. 147).  These 
responses perhaps demonstrate how alternative frameworks have been 
marginalised in relation to the strategies and techniques of ‘administering life’.   
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3.3.3. Technologies of diagnosis  
As demonstrated in the present case narrative, presented in section 3.1.2, re-
feeding practices, although increasingly problematized in relation to ‘risk’ and the 
‘degree’ of AN (see section 3.3.7), are founded upon the unquestioned 
problematization of AN as an individualized clinical entity (Malson et al., 2004).  
In 1960, Dally and Sargant referred to AN as specific syndrome, with a long 
established history, that could be diagnosed according to ‘essential criteria’.  
Forty years later, the authoritative and essential criteria stated that a refusal to 
maintain a normal body weight, an intense fear of weight gain, a distorted body 
image and/or the denial of the seriousness of low body weight, and amenorrhea 
(or reduced sex drive in males) constituted AN (APA, 2000).  Proposed revisions 
to DSM-5, due for publication in summer 2013, include the removal of 
amenorrhea and percentage of normal weight from the diagnostic criteria (APA, 
2012). 
In his 1969 monograph, Dally worked to present a narrative of continuity by 
retrospectively diagnosing Richard Morton’s descriptions from 1694 of ‘nervous 
atrophy’ as cases of anorexia.  Other authors have also retrospectively 
diagnosed incidences of fasting in the Middle Ages as AN (Halmi, 1983; Selvini-
Palazolli, 1974/1963).  Applying diagnoses retrospectively works to authenticate 
the ‘syndrome’ as a “transhistorical” entity, with essential features, that was 
waiting to be discovered (Malson, 1998, p. 50).  
Following Foucault, who worked against ‘presentism’33, and Malson (1988), who 
in her genealogy of AN, delineated the discontinuities and contingencies in 
relation to temporal conceptualisations of self-starvation in the context of the 
discursive practices of gender, femininity, subjectivity and embodiment, I will 
briefly examine the expertise and authority of defining self-starvation as AN 
during the twentieth century. 
As outlined in section 3.1.1, during the 1950s there were disagreements about 
whether AN constituted a psychiatric syndrome, for example, Kay and Russell 
(1953) concluded that the diverse symptomatology indicated that anorexia was 
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 Constructing a history of the past in terms of the present. 
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not a distinct clinical entity.  However, this was not the first time that the status of 
anorexia as a psychiatric disorder had been questioned.  In 1914, medical 
autopsies reported the destruction of the anterior lobe of the pituitary in fatal 
cases of cachexia.  This observation led to Simmonds’ disease displacing AN as 
the dominant problematization of emaciation for over two decades (Garfinkel & 
Garner, 1982; Russell, 1970).  Despite weight loss as a pituitary disorder 
dominating conceptualisations of emaciation, there were spaces in which 
Simmonds’ disease as a medical understanding for all weight loss was resisted 
and contested, for instance, by Sheldon (1939) and Ryle (1936).  
Simmonds’ disease emerged within the technologies and authority of physical 
medicine and science – before psychiatry was interwoven as an extension of 
physical medicine (see section 3.2.4) – and offered a physical cure: hormonal 
therapies.  In contrast, anorexia was within the domain of mental disorders, which 
were considered to be highly stigmatising (Rose, 1985) and lacked effective 
treatments (Russell, 1970). 
As would be expected with scientific research (see Boyle 2002), the failure of 
hormonal treatments to cure cachexia led to a revision of the signs and 
symptoms used to diagnose Simmonds’ disease in the late 1940s (Russell, 1970, 
p. 8).  This opened space for the “rediscovery” of AN (Garfinkel & Garner, 1982) 
and although some cases of cachexia continued to be diagnosed as Simmonds’, 
the remainder returned to the domain of psychiatry.  In this context, Dally and 
Sargant (1960) and other psychiatrists reassumed authority in managing 
emaciated clients and administering their expertise in relation to the physical 
techniques of leucotomy, ECT and major tranquilizers. 
Historical accounts of anorexia have tended to overlook queries regarding its 
status as a distinct psychiatric disorder and construct narratives of continuity, 
which position AN as a longstanding and transhistorical syndrome.  Dally and 
Sargant (1960), for example, presented AN as a well-established clinical disorder 
with essential diagnostic criteria, which they linked to Gull’s account of anorexia 
nervosa from 1874.  Others (e.g. Russell, 1970; Selvini-Palazzoli, 1974/1963; 
Garner & Garfinkel, 1982) have acknowledged the discontinuity within AN’s 
history and attributed the period in which AN was marginalised to non-objective 
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and anti-scientific practices, in which the hypothesis of Simmonds’ disease was 
doggedly maintained despite its falsification, or to the misdiagnosis of AN as 
Simmonds’ disease. 
Similarly to Dally and Sargant, in the second volume of Modern Trends in 
Psychological Medicine, Russell (1970) argued that AN was an illness or 
syndrome with a constellation of symptoms and signs which permitted a reliable 
diagnosis to be made.  According to Russell, its status as a clinical syndrome 
could be inferred from research that demonstrated the course of the illness 
“breeds true” (p. 135).  That is to say the course of anorexia – disturbances of 
appetite, irregular or an absence of menses and low, or fluctuations in, weight – 
remained the same in over fifty per cent of patients who experienced relapse or 
chronicity (Russell, 1970).  It is worth briefly noting that the fear of gaining weight 
or fear of fatness was not put forward as a symptom of anorexia until the 1970s 
(Morgan & Russell, 1975; Russell, 1970). 
Formal diagnostic criteria for AN were first published in the ‘Feigner criteria’, a 
nosology of disorders compiled for research purposes, in 1972 (Feighner, 
Robins, Guze, Woodruff, Winokur & Munoz, 1972).  The Feigner criteria informed 
the development of the third edition of the DSM, which became the authoritative 
taxonomy of mental disorders (Kendler, Muñoz & Murphy, 2010), and in 1980, 
AN was included in DSM-III (APA, 1980).  Not everyone agreed with the criteria 
set out by Feigner and his colleagues and, subsequently, DSM-III because of the 
amount of weight loss – 25% – required a diagnosis and general disagreement 
about the “clinical features necessary for a diagnosis” (Garfinkel & Garner, 1982, 
p. 26).  The inclusion of AN in the DSM, however, also marked its standing as a 
recognised mental disorder, which was particularly important in the US, where 
private medical insurance required billable disorders (Kirk & Kutchins, 1999).  
Since the 1980s, however, psychiatric problematizations of self-starvation have 
become increasingly ‘black boxed’ (Latour, 1987), as later revisions to the 
diagnostic criteria were based on the assumption that AN had a long history with 
“essential features” (Walsh, 1997, p. 335).   
Notably, since the 1950s, when self-starvation was re-problematized as a mental 
disorder, the ability of psychiatric methods to cure AN has not improved, yet it 
74 
 
continues to ‘delimit the sayable’ by dominating conceptualisations of, and 
responses to, self-starvation and marginalising critical or alternative discourses.  
It also delimits the ‘doable’, that is to say it shapes ‘appropriate’ and ‘necessary’ 
responses to self-starvation within the bio-political strategies for administering life 
and risk. 
3.3.4. Transforming psychiatric techniques 
As discussed in section 3.2, Dally and Sargant’s (1960; 1966) use of 
chlorpromazine and insulin in re-feeding emerged in relation to psychiatry’s 
‘successful new’ physical treatments and the reconfiguration of psychiatry as 
‘mental medicine’, an extension of physical medicine.   
Dally and Sargant justified the use of chlorpromazine in relation to concerns 
about deaths among self-starving individuals because it achieved rapid weight 
gain.  Discussing Dally and Sargant’s new treatment, Russell (1970) stated, 
however, that “this heroic treatment is not without risk” (p. 153), for instance, from 
the risk of a hypoglycaemic coma from insulin, or hypothermia from 
chlorpromazine.  Russell also commented on the use of ECT and modified 
leucotomy, advocated in some cases by Dally and Sargant, and argued that ECT 
had “very limited value for patients showing a severe degree of depression” and 
that the outcome of leucotomy was unpredictable and, therefore, should be 
“undertaken very seldom and only as a last resort” (1970, pp. 153-155).  At the 
start of the 1970s, Russell, marking a move away from psychiatry’s reliance on 
physical treatments, placed much greater emphasis on skilled nursing and dietary 
treatment on inpatient wards, in relation to restoring weight and “breaking the 
entrenched habits which have led to the loss of weight” (1970, p. 152).  Restoring 
weight was no longer a sufficient outcome; changing conduct in relation to fears 
of gaining weight had also emerged as central to re-feeding practices.  In addition 
to concerns about the risk of chlorpromazine, this shift in relation to aims and 
practices also emerged in the context of the high profile anti-psychiatry 
movement (see section 3.2.6) and resurgence of feminism.  
Reflecting on the practice of administering chlorpromazine in re-feeding 
regimens, Garfinkel and Garner (1982) noted that while it reduced anxiety and 
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resistance to eating and weight gain and sedated the individual, which made 
bedrest more tolerable, its negative effects outweighed the benefits.  The 
negatives included its exacerbation of physical consequences of self-starvation, 
such as lowering an already low blood pressure and reducing body temperature.  
Chlorpromazine had also led to the development of bulimia – a new category of 
eating disorder proposed by Russell in 1979 – in 45% of Dally and Sargant’s 
treated patients.   
Over a decade later, Wakeling (1995) commented that the use of phenothiazines, 
such as chlorpromazine, had spread to the rest of Europe and America.  He 
stated, however, that in the UK their use had declined on the basis of their known 
harmful effects in malnourished patients, the view that rapid weight gain was no 
longer constituted as a good measure of outcome, and that psychological 
approaches were effective in achieving weight restoration.  Wakeling criticised 
the use of phenothiazines in patients diagnosed with AN and distanced himself 
from those psychiatrists who “inappropriately” used pharmacological 
interventions.   
In the 2003 handbook of eating disorders, Bruna and Fogteloo continued to 
express the view that weight restoration was not a sufficient measure for a 
‘complete recovery’.  In their chapter, which was organized around research 
evidence, they stated that there had not been any trials of neuroleptics in the 
treatment of AN since the 1980s, when a study concluded that neuroleptics 
provided no additional benefit to general inpatient treatment.  Bruna and Fogteloo 
also referred to a systematic review which had found no evidence that 
pharmacotherapy improved outcomes.  Despite drawing on the research 
evidence and noting the potentially harmful effects of neuroleptics and tricyclic 
antidepressants – for instance, they could increase the prolonged QT interval, 
which has been associated with palpitations, syncope and sudden death – they 
argued that there was still a role for pharmacotherapy in the management of AN. 
Interestingly, despite highlighting the problems and risks associated with 
chlorpromazine, and other neuroleptics, and arguing that skilled nursing and 
nutritional management (which address eating behaviours and nutritional 
restoration) were more effective and desirable, all of the above authors stated 
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that neuroleptics continue to have a role in the management of AN if other 
methods fail.  As illustrated below, it seems that Garner and Garfinkel, Wakeling 
and Bruna and Fogteloo recommend the use of major tranquilisers for those who 
cannot be governed or self-govern, by which I mean those who fail or refuse to 
comply with the re-feeding practices and the goal of weight restoration.   
Garfinkel and Garner (1982) stated that they continued to use the drug, typically 
not exceeding a daily dose of 300mg, in order to relieve tension, “for the minority 
of patients who show marked anxiety to foods and inability to eat after the 
general supportive measures have been attempted” (p. 244).  Following his 
condemnation of phenothiazines with self-starving patients, Wakeling, also 
suggested that they continued to have a role in treatment: 
Given the recognised dangers of major tranquiliser, particularly in 
malnourished subjects, it is surprising that such drugs are used at 
all in anorexia nervosa.  There is also a complete absence of any 
research evidence for their efficacy in terms of outcome. 
Nevertheless, these drugs may have a small and limited role in 
treatment used in a pragmatic way.  Use is generally confined to 
those patients who continue to show marked anxiety and agitation 
and inability to eat in a general and supportive treatment setting … 
[and] in older patients with chronic and seemingly intractable 
illnesses who continue to resist refeeding. 
      (Wakeling, 1995, p. 354). 
Similarly, Bruna and Fogteloo (2003) argued that “the benefits do not outweigh 
the harms”.  They advocated, however, the use of pharmacotherapy in cases 
where “comorbidity interferes with the development of therapeutic process” and 
“in cases of treatment resistance and perhaps in cases in which relapse is likely” 
(p. 313).  It could be argued that when conduct cannot be shaped with 
psychological methods alone, despite their risks of harm and potential for 
iatrogenic effects, major tranquilizers are considered appropriate and necessary 
life administering techniques in the management of self-starving individuals. 
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While major tranquilisers continue to be reviewed and advocated, the use of 
minor tranquilizers – anxiolytics such as benzodiazepines – has become 
increasingly marginalised.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Garner and Garfinkel and 
Wakeling reviewed the use of anxiolytics and stated that although anxiolytics 
were more effective at reducing anxiety concerning eating, without the harmful or 
undesirable effects of neuroleptics, psychiatrists were reluctant to prescribe them 
because of the potential for dependence and misuse.  In the second edition of the 
Handbook of Eating Disorders (2003), there was no reference to anxiolytics in the 
chapter on drug treatments.  In contrast to neuroleptics and tricyclic 
antidepressants, which produce unpleasant effects, benzodiazepines “cause a 
sensation of pleasure or euphoria as well as sedation” and prolonged use, over 
three weeks, typically leads to withdrawal symptoms which are less severe if their 
use is reduced more slowly (Moncrieff, 2009, p. 96).  Challenging concerns about 
their dependence, Moncrieff (2009) stated that in one study GPs reported that 
most patients prescribed benzodiazepines did not have difficulty stopping them.  
Minor tranquilizers were widely prescribed in the 1960s and 1970s – by the 
1970s one in five American women were prescribed them (Porter, 2002).  
Curiously, perhaps, their widespread use, which with all pharmacological 
interventions was not unproblematic, did not broadly infiltrate re-feeing 
programmes. 
It would appear that attitudes towards the use of psychiatry’s physical techniques 
have shifted during the last fifty years, with, in some cases, condemnation of their 
use with malnourished patients.  Pharmacological interventions, although not 
recommended as a ‘primary’ treatment for anorexia in the UK (NICE, 2004), 
continue to be advocated and used in less covert ways in order to induce desired 
conduct and ‘normal’ bodies.  The newer anti-depressants are also advocated for 
‘comorbid conditions’ (NICE, 2003), although their effectiveness is limited in 
malnourished states (Wakeling, 1995; Treasure & Schmidt, 2002).  
3.3.5. From inpatient to community apparatuses 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the NHS provided a context of comprehensive and 
preventative health for the population intertwined with the strategy of maximising 
public health and the economic fitness of the UK (Rose, 1998).  As explicated in 
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section 3.2.4, the repositioning of psychiatry, through legal and policy changes, 
extended the authority and expertise of psychiatry to administer and manage 
individuals with milder or neurotic disturbances.  Within these contexts, a shift to 
community apparatuses for administering ‘mental medicine’ occurred.  More 
generally, community programmes in the UK, France and the US were developed 
with the objectives of “covering the maximum amount of ground, reaching the 
maximum number of people, through the deployment of a unified apparatus 
linked to the machinery of the state” (Castel, 1991, cited in Rose, 1996b, p. 4).   
Within the community, bio-medicine, including psychiatry and allied disciplines, 
reconfigured its patients in accordance with strategies of social citizenship.  
Programmes of education, social housing and public broadcasting constituted the 
individual as a social citizen in a network of societal relations (Rose, 1996a).  
Those diagnosed with mental disorders, no longer passive recipients of ‘care’, 
were reconfigured as individual social citizens.  The subjectivities of social 
citizens were imbricated within networks of moral and ethical responsibilities to 
their family and community and their own health.   
Community programmes for individuals diagnosed with AN, however, lagged 
behind other areas of psychiatric medicine; the first day programmes for people 
diagnosed with anorexia were not introduced until 1989 (Zipfel et al., 2002).  Prior 
to, and since 1989, the hospital has continued to be a central site for 
problematizing and administering self-starving individuals.  More recently, 
however, the hospital has been conceptualised within a staged approach to care 
in the UK (NICE, 2003) and there has been a move to the development of 
SEDUs, specialist apparatus for administering eating disorders (RCP, 2010).  
Dally and Sargant’s treatment was administered within a hospital.  Although they 
did not explicitly discuss the site of treatment, they quoted Gull’s assertion that 
patients should be “surrounded by people who would have moral control over 
them; relatives and friends being generally the worst attendants” (1960, p. 1770).  
In the early seventies, Russell stated that inpatient admission was usually 
necessary in cases of “considerable weight loss” (1970, p. 151) and Bruch (1973) 
argued that hospitalisation was, in some cases, a necessary ‘life-saving’ 
measure. 
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In place of major tranquilizers, Russell (1970) suggested that skilled and 
experienced nurses could administer re-feeding regimens in inpatient settings 
and create “surroundings favourable to breaking the entrenched habits which 
have led to the loss of weight” (Russell, 1970, p. 152).  This suggests that the 
family continued to be problematized as ‘unfavourable surroundings’.  The 
hospital, however, was also positioned as an essential apparatus for the 
application of life-administering techniques. 
Not everyone during this period agreed that psychiatric or medical inpatient 
treatment was a useful intervention.  Selvini-Palazzoli (1974/1963), for instance, 
argued that in the interests of the “patient’s psychological health, it is advisable to 
avoid hospitalization if there is any alternative” because “patients see all hospitals 
as places of torture, humiliation and oppression” (p. 116).  According to Garner 
and Garfinkel, Browning and Miller (1968) also suggested that inpatient 
admission did little to help the course of AN.  Beck and Brøchner-Mortensen 
(1954) stated that when hospitalisation was used, individuals had better 
outcomes in general rather than mental hospitals (cited in Russell, 1970).  
Russell (1970) argued that the better outcomes in general hospitals could not be 
interpreted as a measure of success because the patient groups in general and 
mental hospitals were incomparable; those treated in mental hospitals presented 
with “a more florid psychopathology” (1970, p. 151).  The lack of success, 
therefore, was not attributable to the psychiatric apparatus but to internal 
individual factors.   
Back in 1936, however, the period when anorexia was largely displaced by 
Simmonds’ disease, case series research published by Ryle in the Lancet, 
indicated that self-starving people could ‘recover’ or ‘improve’ without being 
admitted to hospital.  Table 3.3.5a below summarises the results of the 3634 
individuals whom Ryle had treated and traced, and illustrates the number of 
‘recoveries’ that occurred at home. 
 
                                            
34
 Ryle stated that he had traced 37 patients and that 6 were not improved but I could only count 5 
improved or relapsed patients in his reported data. 
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Table 3.3.5.a. Outcomes and treatment method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ryle stated, perhaps in anticipation of critiques of his findings, that his experience 
of managing anorexia was in the context of “consulting and hospital practice” and 
that “the disease was well established” in most cases (1936, p. 897).  Similarly to 
Dally and Sargant, Ryle recommended bed rest until a stone of weight or more 
had been gained.  In contrast, however, he concluded that positive outcomes 
could be achieved at home.  He also argued that in situations where the home 
environment was not suitable, treatment should be provided in a nursing-home 
rather than a hospital ward, which was an “unsuitable place for treatment” (1936, 
p. 898).  In contrast to the notion that ‘recovery’ was contingent upon the 
expertise of the physician or psychiatrist to administer the self-starved body, Ryle 
commented on an individual’s natural propensity to recover within the context of 
her life: 
The natural resilience of youth, a happy change in circumstance, a 
new interest and time contribute to many recoveries independently 
of the physician’s endeavours. 
(Ryle, 1936, p. 897) 
It is worth noting that Ryle was a physician by training and a Professor of Physic 
[medicine] at the University of Cambridge.  In 1943 he was appointed Professor 
of Social Medicine, which reflected his views that syndromes and diseases were 
not simply to be found in a person’s body, but in relation to their environment and 
social-cultural lives (Ryle, 1943). 
Noteworthy, Garfinkel and Garner (1982) refer to Ryle’s 1936 paper in their 
discussion of researchers who reconnected with Gull’s work during the 
 Home 
treatment 
Home & 
institutional 
treatment 
Institutional 
treatment 
Other 
(Christian 
Science) 
Complete recovery 17 2 1 1 
Improved 5 1   
Improved but relapsed   1  
Not improved 3 1   
Died  4   
Total cases 25 8 2 1 
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displacement of anorexia in the 1930s.  They also cited Ryle’s paper in their 
discussion of death in anorexia and the importance of a supportive environment.  
Ryle’s view that hospitalisation in undesirable and unnecessary, however, was 
excluded from the accounts by Garfinkel and Garner, Kay (1953), Dally and 
Sargant (1960; 1960) and Russell (1970; 1977). 
Eventually, as Treasure, Todd and Szmukler (1995) noted, the apparatuses for 
administering and managing AN followed the rest of medicine and shifted 
towards community care.  As discussed in section 3.1.2, current NICE guidance 
recommends a stepped approach to care; that most people diagnosed with AN 
should be treated on an outpatient basis, while inpatient care should be reserved 
for the most ‘unwell’ or ‘at risk’ self-starving individuals (NICE, 2004; RCP, 2010; 
2012).  Day treatments, another stepped up treatment in the community for 
anorexia, have also emerged.  Robinson (2003) argued that day treatments are 
preferable where possible because inpatient settings, which are typically 
hierarchical, tend to replicate the “anorexic pseudo-conflict” (p. 335) of the family 
and use coercive methods of treatment, perhaps implying that coercive 
techniques do not occur within daypatient settings.  He also argued that day 
treatments are preferred to inpatient treatments, evidenced by the termination of 
a study in Edinburgh that sought to compare inpatient and day patient treatment 
because referrals were predominantly for day treatments.   
Treatment, whether in hospital or in the community, continues to centre on re-
feeding and restoring weight to normal levels in order to reduce physical risk, 
normalise endocrine processes and alleviate the psychological and cognitive 
disturbances assumed to be associated with starvation.  In other words, to 
employ techniques and apparatus to induce a ‘normal’ body that has the ‘right to 
life’.  Increasingly, it has become assumed that this can only occur with the 
intervention of psychiatric professionals, whether in the context of inpatient, 
daypatient or outpatient sites.  Theander (1995), similarly to Ryle (1936), stated 
that “[n]owadays we are more aware there is an inherent tendency in the eating 
disorders towards spontaneous healing” (p. 22).  This awareness, however, has 
not appeared to infiltrate problematizations of starvation, which have become 
increasingly entangled within the matrix of psychotherapy, inpatient and 
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outpatient units, multi-disciplinary teams and integrative approaches to administer 
and manage re-feeding practices.  Psychiatric problematizations, which are 
claimed to have developed according to positivist practices, unsurprisingly, call 
for specialist psychiatric technologies, and in the process marginalise spaces for 
other perspectives or understandings. 
3.3.6. Constituting the self-starving body as a risky body 
In his review of the identity and treatment of AN, Russell (1970) stated that 
malnutrition was probably responsible for the majority of the physical 
complications (with the exception of amenorrhea) and fatalities (with the 
exception of suicide).  He called for more specialist knowledge regarding the self-
starved body because of the potentially dangerous physical complications, and 
perhaps psychological affects, of malnutrition.  
In 1982, Garner and Garfinkel devoted a chapter to reviewing the growing 
literature on the physical complications of starvation.  The emergent literature 
relating to the starving body drew on the Minnesota studies, which were 
conducted with ‘conscientious objectors’ towards the end of the Second World 
War to learn more about the “psychobiological effects of starvation” (Keys, 
Brozek & Henschel, 1950).  As demonstrated in Garner and Garfinkel’s chapter, 
the self-starving body was reconfigured as pathological in relation to techniques 
that constituted and measured ‘vital norms’ relating to cardiovascular and 
respiratory changes, renal changes, electrolytes, oedema, haematological 
changes, gastrointestinal complications, neurological complications, dental 
changes and skeletal maturation.  The self-starving – anorexic – body was 
reconstituted as a “physico-chemical body” (Sheets-Johnstone, 1992, p. 135).   
The self-starving physico-chemical body was configured in relation to its deviation 
from ‘normal’ physico-chemical health, in relation to growing clinical and research 
literature.  Ussher (2011) has argued that emphasis on the ‘material’ body and 
biomedical treatments is inevitable within a ‘positivist/realist paradigm’ (p. 52). 
The morbid self-starving body has continued to be an important site for specialist 
knowledge and techniques.  Treasure and Szmuckler (1995) located their review 
of physical complications in relation to concerns about the higher than normal 
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mortality rates among self-starving bodies diagnosed with AN.  They stated that 
the mortality rate was six times that of the population, a figure that continues to 
be cited today (Steinhausen, 2002), which was comparable to other psychiatric 
conditions five years following inpatient treatment.  They also commented that 
suicide, and not starvation, was the commonest cause of reported deaths.   
Reviewing the physical complications, Treasure and Szmuckler (1995) focused 
on those that had been “the subject of recent interest” and which were “of clinical 
significance” (p. 197).  They problematized the self-starved body in relation to 
growth and development, osteoporosis, fertility and pregnancy, the central 
nervous system and weight cycling.  They argued that many, although not all, of 
the changes were reversible following weight restoration, highlighting the 
importance of re-feeding techniques.  They also suggested that the physical 
complications perpetuated anorexia physically, emotionally and psychologically.  
Moving beyond a mere discussion of the complications and ‘threats to life’, 
Treasure and Szmuckler also compiled a table of recommended investigations 
for administering different phases of treatment: the initial assessment, during re-
feeding and in severe chronic anorexia.  The table of investigations provided a 
standardised and detailed technique for the administration of life and risk in 
relation to self-starving bodies across different sites.  The physico-chemical body 
was morphing into a physically risky body that could be assessed and managed 
during re-feeding practices. 
In addition to the risks to the self-starving body in the present, reviews began to 
describe the potential risks for permanent or future ill-health (NICE, 2004; Zipfel, 
Löwe & Herzog, 2003).  The self-starving body became knowable in relation to 
risks of pathology or abnormality in the future.   
Young women with anorexia nervosa are at increased risk of bone 
fractures later in life (Lucas et al., 1999). The effects on the 
endocrine system have their impact on target organs, causing 
infertility, a risk of polycystic ovaries and loss of bone 
mineralisation. Where pubertal development has not been 
completed, incomplete development of secondary sexual 
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characteristics may occur (Goldbloom & Kennedy, 1995) and 
permanent stunting of growth is common.  
(NICE CG9, 2004, p.15) 
Increasingly, the self-starving body became constituted as “physically dangerous, 
often in ways that are not apparent”, as deviations from ‘vital norms’ were not 
detected on simple exams such as the electrocardiogram or blood tests (Mickley, 
1999, p. 16).  The adult MARSIPAN guidance recommended specialist 
administration and management because self-starving individuals “can seem 
deceptively well” and “may appear very energetic right up to a physical collapse” 
(RCP, 2010, p. 14).  Canguilhem’s notion of health lying in the silence of the 
organs was reconfigured to health in relation to the lowest risk of permanent or 
future complications and premature death. 
Despite the growth in knowledge and techniques, fatalities were reported during 
re-feeding – life-administering – interventions.  Rose argued (1996) that failures 
create spaces for more elaborate techniques.  In this case, fatalities in the 
context of re-feeding regimens led to the creation of the MARSIPAN guidelines 
(2010; 2012) to assist in the standardised management of ‘severe’ and ‘risky’ AN.   
3.3.7. Administering life-saving measures 
Rose (2001) argued that risk has been prevalent in bio-politics for over 150 
years, evidenced in the early strategies of hygiene, which reformed the external 
sewage and water conditions in order to reduce the frequency and probability of 
ill-health or morbidity across populations.  In the second half of the twentieth 
century, in the context of advanced liberal strategies of government and the right 
to life, the focus shifted to the minimisation of current and potential risks to health. 
Rose (2007) argued that the administration of risk transformed the professional 
subjectivity of psychiatrists, with risk emerging as the primary framework for 
dividing techniques and criterion for intervention.  Discourses of ‘high risk’ and 
‘low risk’, for instance, divided “the prudent self from the imprudent self, the self 
able to manage itself from the self who must be managed by others” (Rose, 
1996b, p. 14). 
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Dally and Sargant spoke of the “much graver risks of allowing states of inanition 
to continue indefinitely” to justify the unpleasant and harmful effects of their 
treatment (1960, p. 1770).  It could be argued that they were implying that without 
intervention continued self-starvation would inevitably lead to death.  In 1970, 
Russell stated that the first stage of treatment was aimed at “saving life” (p. 151).  
The administration of life in relation to self-starving bodies through weight 
restoration became an increasing priority, reinforcing the primary role of re-
feeding practices.  Not everyone prioritised weight restoration in their work on 
self-starving bodies, however, and the negative consequences of this were 
highlighted: 
Not paying attention to the low weight, as is sometimes done in 
psychoanalytic treatment … results in a chronic anorexic state. 
(Bruch, 1978/2001, p. 103). 
Bruch’s comment is noteworthy, considering the chronic state that was deemed 
inevitable to a large proportion of cohorts diagnosed with AN (Dally, 1969; 
Russell, 1970). 
As stated by Russell in 1970, the first stage of managing the self-starving 
individual was achieving physical normality and saving life, ideally with the 
consent and cooperation of the individual – a shift from Dally and Sargant’s 
treatment.  The second stage involved psychological techniques35 to address 
individual and/or family psychopathology that had caused or was perpetuating the 
disorder.  Fundamentally, the starving body was the primary target for restoring 
health as discussed in section 3.3.6. 
Although the primary goal continues to be “to return body weight to a healthy 
level” (NICE, 2004, p. 82), saving life has gradually morphed into discourses of 
administering risk as demonstrated in the MARSIPAN guidance.  The guidance 
provided criteria for identifying “really sick patients” and self-starving bodies at 
“the highest risk” (RCP, 2012, p. 14).  Standardised weight criteria divide the risky 
and really sick from the moderately sick.  The authors also noted that higher 
                                            
35
 A genealogical exploration of psychological techniques is beyond the scope of this professional 
doctorate thesis. 
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weights can also be risky if accompanied by purging behaviours or over-
exercising.  Techniques were provided for monitoring and minimising risks 
through risk assessment practices, which centre on the physico-chemical body, 
and specialist guidance to manage re-feeding.  A detailed list of the types of 
‘risky’ and deceptive behaviours to remain vigilant for, particularly in relation to 
those who appear outwardly compliant with the re-feeding treatment but fail to 
gain weight, was also provided.  In addition to constant assessment, or 
surveillance, of the body and the individual’s conduct, the re-feeding regimen for 
‘high risk’ or ‘severely’ low weight bodies recommended 24 hour bed rest (RCP, 
2010; 2012).  In section 3.3.4, I also described how pharmacological 
interventions continue to be advocated for self-starving bodies unable to eat in “a 
general and supportive treatment setting” and with those “who continue to resist 
re-feeding” (Wakeling, 1995, p. 354). 
In this chapter I have traced a number of the events within the network of 
relations that continue to position re-feeding as a primary treatment regimen for 
the self-starving body.  I also highlighted some of the techniques and knowledges 
that have tended to be overlooked, excluded or disqualified.  On the basis of the 
analysis of descent, I would suggest that self-starving bodies have become 
increasingly specified and subjectified in relation to technologies of power and 
technologies of the self.  In spite of the expanding specificity, practices of 
surveillance and new dividing techniques for those ‘at highest risk’, however, re-
feeding practices have not changed remarkably over the last 50 years.   
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this section, I revisit and discuss the aims of this thesis in the context of the 
genealogical exploration. I then consider criteria for evaluating this thesis and 
reflect on the process of undertaking a genealogical approach to re-feeding 
before discussing the potential implications for clinical practice and research. 
4.1. Summary of Research and Aims 
The purpose of this research was to problematize the practice of re-feeding as 
the primary treatment for self-starving individuals.  Firstly, with the aim of 
destabilising taken-for-granted truths about the approach, which silence 
questions and prevents other approaches from emerging, to show that practices 
which appear necessary, inevitable or beneficial can be understood as contingent 
and contestable . Secondly, with the intention of highlighting the reciprocal 
relations between the ‘psy’ disciplines and technologies of power and the self in 
relation to re-feeding practices. These aims were based upon conclusions in the 
research literature that only half of the people who are diagnosed with anorexia 
make a good or satisfactory recovery (Claudino et al., 2006; Steinhausen, 2002), 
The research aims were addressed through the employment of past and current 
case narratives, followed by mapping the surface of emergence for the past case 
history and tracing the descent between the current and past case histories. The 
practical considerations of a professional doctorate thesis, in terms of time and 
word count, restricted the focus to a small number of events from the ‘field of 
action’.  Arguably, I could have, and would have liked to, explored more events 
mapped within the dispositif, for instance, the family, the female body, the 
psychology of the self-starved body. 
In the surface of emergence chapter, I traced the network of relations in which 
psychiatry became configured as a mental medicine within the bio-political 
strategies of individualised and preventative medicine.  These bio-political 
strategies prioritised and extended the processes of physical illness to ‘mental 
illness’.  Techniques from surgical medicine, drugs which were seen to have 
calming effects, were employed in psychiatric contexts and, in the process, 
shored up psychiatry’s expertise and authority in relation to administering and 
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managing mental disorders; pharmacological techniques produced docile and 
compliant subjectivities, as evidenced in Dally and Sargant’s (1960) new 
treatment.  The compliant, heavily sedated, starved bodies were rapidly 
reconstituted as ‘normal’ bodies, in appearance and reproductive potential, at 
least in the short-term.  In the longer-term, without surveillance and psychiatry’s 
techniques, the success of the new treatment was more difficult to determine.  
Nearly half of the 48 treated individuals developed deviant conduct in relation to 
food, they started binging on food, and self-starving subjectivities persisted for 
nearly half of the treated bodies.  Although the techniques created numerous 
unpleasant and harmful effects and were only effective in the short-term, they 
positioned psychiatry as an authoritative apparatus for administering and 
managing the conduct and interpersonal and physical subjectivities of self-
starving bodies.  Dally and Sargant’s research and treatment, which reached 
Europe and America, also assertively constituted self-starving bodies as 
‘anorexic’ bodies.  These anorexic bodies, which required specialist techniques, 
were constituted as symptomatic in relation to psychological – or family – 
pathology and deviation from physical – or hormonal – health. 
In tracing the analysis of descent, I examined the rise in the documentary 
apparatus and number of anorexic bodies.  The self-starved bodies were firmly 
constituted within the authority of psychiatry following the inclusion of anorexia 
nervosa in the DSM in 1980.  In the context of community or hospital 
apparatuses, the physico-chemical body became the key site for subjectification 
in order to restore ‘vital norms’.   The self-starved body became re-reconfigured 
and acted upon in relation to the growth of specialist knowledge and the rising 
number of bodies to administer.  In parallel, the subjectivities of psychiatrists and 
allied professionals became increasingly constituted as administrators of risk.  In 
the context of the free and autonomous individuals, the self-starving body was 
divided and subjectified in relation to its riskiness.  For the most risky, life 
administering measures in the form of standardised and constant techniques of 
assessment and management were recommended.  And for those who could not 
or would not subjectify themselves in accordance with the re-feeding treatment 
regimen, pharmacological techniques, at smaller doses than advocated by Dally 
and Sargant, have been recommended within the context of administering life. 
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4.2. Evaluation and Critical Review 
In this section, I consider issues of evaluation in relation to genealogical 
approaches and this thesis before reflecting on the process of undertaking a 
Foucauldian genealogy.  I finish the chapter reflecting on the usefulness of the 
current genealogical approach within the context of clinical practice and research.  
4.2.1. Assessing quality  
Harper (2013), commenting on rise of qualitative methods in clinical psychology 
theses, highlighted that qualitative methods depend on the “researcher’s 
knowledge and skill” rather than their ability to simply apply a collection of 
techniques “off the shelf” (p. 21).  He argued that in order to approach the 
analysis in a theoretically consistent way, the researcher needs to become 
immersed in the theoretical and empirical literature.  Firstly, in the process of 
undertaking this thesis, I have made efforts to become familiar with the work of 
Foucault and Rose, among others, in order to develop a Foucauldian lens or 
framework to bring to my corpus of statements.  Such an undertaking was 
ambitious and, in many ways, I feel my reading and engagement with their work 
is just commencing.  Secondly, undertaking a genealogical analysis within a 
conceptual framework which required an acceptance of “epistemological 
uncertainty” (Tamboukou & Ball, 2003), and a move away from the majority of my 
psychological knowledge and training, I eagerly sought a thesis supervisor who 
had used and commented on Foucauldian scholarship and genealogical analysis 
in her work. 
A particular challenge with adopting a genealogical approach was that 
genealogists such Foucault, Rose, Tamboukou and Butler have purposively 
avoided producing closed methodologies, which could be used ‘off the shelf’ and 
lead to genealogical research being assimilated within a positivist framework.  As 
an alternative to a closed methodological framework, I tried to explicate 
Foucault’s theories of bio-power and governmentality, which were central to this 
thesis, and summarise commentaries of genealogical investigations to set the 
scene for the current exploration.  Stopping short of a closed methodology, I 
explicated the research strategies and tools guiding this social and historical 
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investigation of the discursive practices which have worked to constitute re-
feeding practices. Finally, in undertaking a genealogical exploration I have 
“created my own rhythms, made selections and decided on inclusions and 
exclusions” (Tamboukou, 2010, p. 7), shaped by the strategies and inclusion 
criteria set out in the methodology chapter. 
Genealogy as a theoretical-analytical approach without a formal methodology 
poses challenges in terms of an evaluative framework.  Willig (2001) has argued 
that methods of evaluation need to be congruent with the epistemological 
framework employed.  Although Willig did not comment directly on genealogical 
research strategies, she stated that a discursive research approach  
…needs to be evaluated in its own terms – that is as a discursive 
construction in its own right, on the basis of its internal coherence, 
theoretical sophistication and persuasiveness. 
 (Willig, 2001, p. 148). 
She suggested the following questions to assess the quality of narrative 
accounts: 
1. Does it tell a good story? 
2. Does it tell a story which is clear, internally coherent and sufficiently 
differentiated? 
3. Does it generate new insights for readers? 
4. Is it convincing? 
As discussed in section 2.7, in order to address the aims I employed the five 
perspectival dimensions explicated by Rose (1999; 1996a).  My intention was to 
trace the surface of emergence and descent to make visible the reciprocal 
knowledge-power-self relations and reconstitute notions of depth, that is to say, 
the view that present practices are a “culmination of everything that is 
‘progressive’ in that which preceded it” (Rose, 1994, p. 70), as a ‘superficial 
secret’.  It was hoped that by highlighting the multiple discursive practices and 
avoiding ‘presentism’ it would make the contingencies of present subjectivities 
and practices in relation to re-feeding visible and destabilise the unquestioned 
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belief that current practices are the only way of knowing and acting upon self-
starving bodies.  I have attempted to give re-feeding practices “a genealogical 
history, without claiming to capture what the past really was” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982, p. 204).  It is also worth briefly highlighting that my intention was not to 
create an Aristolean story within a framework of beginning-middle-end 
(Tamboukou, 2011).  Rather, to delineate or tell the story of events and relations 
in order to “reveal the meanings of what otherwise would remain the unbearable 
sequence of sheer happening” (Arendt, 1995, p. 104).  It is for the reader to 
decide whether my account stands up to the questions proposed by Willig. 
4.2.2. Reflexivity36 
Hook (2007) commented that a genealogical analysis of a practice within one’s 
own discipline can create tension, as the critical history of an object or event 
requires a critical history of the discipline in which it is located.  Rose (1999; 
2007b) suggested that his work has not sought to critique the ‘psy’ disciplines but 
to make visible the reciprocal relations between the ways we understand and 
work on ourselves.  Following Rose, I have tried to point out the ‘reciprocal 
relations’ between power, knowledges and re-feeding practices which subjectify 
the self-starving individual and those who administer and manage her.   
In the process of undertaking a genealogical analysis of re-feeding practices, I 
have encountered dilemmas in relation to distancing myself from the skills and 
knowledge acquired from studying and training within the discipline of 
psychology37 and working with a different conceptual framework, which seeks to 
demonstrate the contingent, temporal and contestable nature of knowledge and 
practices.  For example, becoming immersed in the anorexia literature led to 
moments, when I reverted to habitual tendencies of reviewing the literature from 
within a positivist frame, where I accepted the inevitability of, or became 
convinced by, the psychological, medical or legal literature regarding self-starving 
individuals and re-feeding practices.  At these times, when I departed from the 
task of genealogy, I was reminded of the importance of engaging with both the 
                                            
36
 As noted in section 2.4 the language of reflexivity is problematic within a material-discursive-
epistemological framework. 
37
 My decision to pursue clinical psychology was not accidental but informed by my interest in the 
theory and belief in the utility of the discipline. 
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theoretical (e.g. the work of Foucault and Rose) and empirical literature (corpus 
of statements).   
I experienced tension in relation to undertaking research with the goal of 
undermining the certainty and inevitability surrounding current practices without 
suggesting alternatives38 .  I tussled with the idea that by not suggesting 
alternatives to re-feeding, I was suggesting we do nothing.   I pondered whether 
by interrogating current practices, which have become inextricably tied to 
discourses of risk and saving lives, I was, therefore, advocating death.  
Momentarily captured by the dichotomy of ‘to act’ (according to current 
understandings) or ‘do nothing’, I was acting and thinking within the technologies 
of self – my own professional subjectivity – that I was trying to step back from and 
interrogate.  These experiences reminded me of the extent to which re-feeding, 
anorexia and specialist treatments have become common sense and powerful 
discourses within an advanced liberal society, which is increasingly preoccupied 
with risk (Rose, 1998; 2001). 
On the other hand, I became increasingly aware that the prioritisation of re-
feeding practices emerged in relation to heterogeneous events and technologies.  
For example, the multiplicity of factors positioning psychiatry as the authority in 
relation to self-starving individuals and the diverse ways in which bodies became 
subjectified in relation to medicine, gender, families and risk.  The literature over 
time also reminded me of the short-term effectiveness of re-feeding practices for 
many, the resilience of individuals to recovery outwith psychiatric contexts and 
the impact of the increasing emphasis on predicting and minimising risk.  At 
times, I wondered what would happen if we were to trust the resilience of youth, 
recognise that we cannot remove death – “some fatalities are inevitable” (RCP; 
2010, p. 10; see section 3.1.2) – and respond in less technical and risk adverse 
ways.  If these ideas infiltrated our thinking, we might, perhaps, start to develop 
different understandings or practices attuned to each person, find that our 
anxieties within services do not govern our actions and thinking, and learn that 
                                            
38
 A frequent criticism of Foucualt’s approach is that it does not – and intentionally so – offer an 
alternative or more true truth (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).   
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people can recover in contexts that are not dominated by psychiatric 
professionals.  However, these ideas appear incompatible with a culture of 
blame, dominant understandings of individuals who self-starve and protocols and 
universal theories relating to individuals who self-starve.   
While engaging with the dilemmas delineated above, I have also been reminded 
of the expectation that this thesis will offer recommendations in relation to clinical 
practice and future research.  In the following section, I work with the dilemma of 
generating recommendations in relation to Foucauldian genealogical approaches 
and the current genealogical investigation. 
4.3. Clinical and Research Implications 
I tentatively suggest that this thesis has attempted to make a unique contribution 
to the literature of re-feeding through the construction of a narrative that 
destabilises the certainties and makes visible the web of relations that delimit the 
‘sayable’ and ‘doable’ in relation to self-starving bodies.   
Moving beyond the aims of the research to highlight the contingency and 
complexity of re-feeding practices and associated practices, I consider possible 
avenues this genealogy could enable us to explore in clinical practice and 
research39.  I acknowledge that my recommendations will be located within 
psychosocial, medical and legal frameworks – the context of the work – which 
Foucault has problematized.  For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
(1977a) commented that central to different and competing models of disciplinary 
punishments in the early nineteenth century was the objective of incarceration.  
Similarly, in compiling a response for alternatives to re-feeding practices, the 
objective would be to support self-starving individuals to recover and engage with 
life giving practices where possible.   
4.3.1. Clinical implications 
The emphasis on the self-governing body appears to fail in the longer term for 
many self-starving individuals.  In contrast to current practices, which, focus on 
                                            
39
 It should be noted that Foucault’s genealogical work was never primarily intended to have 
implications for change either in ‘practice’ or ‘research; its primary focus (i.e. to destabilise the 
status quo of understanding) might be to achieve change in cognition.  
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short-term weight gain as a goal, a broader definition of recovery could support 
self-starving individuals to take up different positions of recovery in relation to 
their body.  For example, moving away from a focus on achieving the 
menstruating body, the weight restored body and the ‘normal’ body.  Shifting the 
focus away from the body could also create opportunities for individuals to live 
their life, in spite of the self-starvation, outside of psychiatric inpatient wards and 
other clinical settings. Working with risk in a supported risk taking, rather than risk 
avoidant, way could also re-create opportunities for an individual’s natural 
resilience to promote their recovery. 
4.3.2. Research implications 
Building on the marginalised research reported by Ryle (1936), positivist and 
post-structuralist research could be undertaken to explore incidences, or people’s 
experiences, of ‘spontaneous recovery’ (i.e. with no professional input) or living 
active or fulfilling lives with a BMI considered to be in the low or unhealthy range.  
Researching populations whose lives are not governed by psychiatric practices 
might challenge the dominant understanding of self-starvation as a sign of 
physical and mental ill-health, and open up potential understandings and 
practices that prevent very low weights from developing in the first place.   
The suggestions above should be read as the tentative ideas of one person who 
has attempted to problematize the practice of re-feeding in order to open up new 
ways to understand.  It is hoped that, as Arendt (2005) suggested, if we to keep 
trying to understand then perhaps we can find new ways to deal with problems, 
ourselves and the world around us: 
Understanding, as distinguished from having correct information 
and scientific knowledge, is a complicated process which never 
produces unequivocal results. It is an unending activity by which, in 
constant change and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile 
ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world. 
(Arendt, 2005, pp. 307-308) 
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6. APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Literature Search 
I initially ran a search on the Academic Search Complete, CINAHL Plus, 
Education Research Complete, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, relevant 
databaseswithin EBSCO, an international online research database.   
The following search terms were used for anorexia nervosa: 
 “anorexia”  
 "anorexia nervosa"  
 "self starvation". 
The following terms were used to search for papers relating to re-feeding: 
 "nutritional rehabilitation"  
 refeeding 
 "re-feeding"  
 "inpatient treatment"  
 "in-patient treatment"  
 "nutritional therapy"  
 "feeding programme"  
 "feeding program"  
 "hospitalization"  
 "hospitalisation"  
 "artificial alimentation" 
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Appendix B: Narrowed Literature Search 
As with the previous search, I ran the searches on the Academic Search 
Complete, CINAHL Plus, Education Research Complete, PsycARTICLES, 
PsycINFO, relevant databases within EBSCO, an international online research 
database 
The time period 2000 to 2013 was applied to the search and the Boolean/Phrase 
search terms for the filtered knowledges and practices are listed below: 
 AN: “anorexia” OR "anorexia nervosa" OR "self starvation". 
AND 
 Recovery :“long-term outcome” OR “long-term effectiveness” OR “long-
term follow-up” 
 Compulsory treatment:  “compulsory admission” OR “compulsory 
treatment” OR “involuntary admission” OR “involuntary treatment” 
 Mortality rates: “crude mortality rate” OR “standardized mortality rate” OR 
“death rate” OR “mortality rate” 
The abstracts of all papers returned were scanned and the complete journal 
articles that were in English and related directly to search area were accessed.  
In addition to this, I sourced and read relevant contemporary and historical 
articles and books referred to in the papers accessed. 
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Reported Causes and Conditions at Time of Death 
Study (Country) 
Total 
deaths 
Unnatural causes (suicides, 
homicides, accidents) (N) 
Recorded death cause AN 
(N) 
Natural causes (possible 
attributable to 
malnutrition/binging/purging/ 
alcohol use) (N) 
Other causes (N) 
Birmingham 
Chadalavada & 
Palmer, 2005
a
 
17 Suicide (7)  Pneumonia (2) 
Hypoglycemia (2) 
 
Subdural hemorrhage (1) 
Cancer (2) 
Liver disease (2)  
Alcohol poisoning (1) 
Button et al. 2010
a
 10 Hanging (2) 
Cerebral hypoxia/anoxia, 
ligature compression neck 
(1) 
Heart failure (1) 
Cardiac asystole/inanition 
(1) Complications of AN (1) 
Pneumonia/ chronic 
malnutrition/alcoholic liver 
disease (1) 
Bleeding esophagealvarices, 
chronic alcoholic liver disease 
(1) 
Alcohol poisoning (1) 
Diabetic ketoacidosis (1) 
 
Crow et al., 2009
a
 7 Suicide (1)   Trauma (1) 
Medical (4) 
Substance use related (1) 
Herzog et al. 
2000
b
 
7 
 
Suicide (3)  Fungal pneumonia (1) 
Cardiac arrhythmia and 
seizure disorder (1) 
Alcohol intoxication (1) 
Cardiorespiratory failure, 
hepatic failure and cirrhosis 
(1) 
 
Hjern, Lindberg & 
Lindblad, 2006
a
 
9 Suicide (2) 
Passenger in car crash (2) 
Underlying cause of death 
AN (2) 
Degenerative heart failure (1) 
 Cancer of the uterus (1) 
Drug overdose (1) 
Huas et al., 2011 40 Suicide (7) Anorexia nervosa (2) 
Cardiac arrests (7)  
Cachexia (3)  
Infection (1) 
 Unknown (10) 
Unclear (10) 
 
Keel et al., 2003
b
 10 
 
Suicide (4) 
 
 Heart and liver failure (1) 
Fungal pneumonia (1) 
Cardiac dysrhythmias (1) 
Diabetes mellitus (1) 
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
(1) 
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p
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Alcohol poisoning (1) 
Study (Country) 
Total 
deaths 
Unnatural causes (suicides, 
homicides, accidents) (N) 
Recorded death cause AN 
(N) 
Natural causes (possible 
attributable to 
malnutrition/binging/purging/ 
alcohol use) (N) 
Other causes (N) 
Löwe et al., 2001
c 
 14 
 
Suicide (2) 7 3 Asthmatic attack (n=1) 
Rectal carcinoma (n=1) 
Millar et al., 2005
a
 23 Carbon monoxide 
poisoning-car exhaust (1) 
Ligature strangulation (1)  
Opiate intoxication (1) 
Myocardial infarction (2) 
Bronchopneumonia(1) 
Cardiac arrhythmia(1)  
Respiratory arrest (1) 
Acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (1) 
Septicaemia shock (1) 
Anorexia nervosa (1) 
Pneumonia (1) Degos syndrome (1) 
Adenocarcinoma (1)  
Esophageal cancer (1) 
Diabetic ketoacidosis (1) 
Hypoglycaemia (1) 
Opiate intoxication (1)  
Unknown/unclear (6) 
Papadopoulos et 
al., 2009
a
 
256 Suicide (84) 
Homicide (4) 
Traffic accidents (7) 
Undefined (19) 
Other (12) 
 
Anorexia nervosa  (39) 
 
Nervous system (4)  
Cardiovascular (11)  
Respiratory (14)  
Endocrine (9)  
Haematopoietic (1)  
Gastrointestinal (6)  
Urogenital (2)  
Autoimmune (3) 
Cancer (29) 
Psychoactive substance use 
(13)  
Other psychiatric disorder (2) 
Other (6) 
 
 
Rosling et al., 
2011
a
 
21 
 
Suicide (7) AN cause of death/ BMI<13 
(6) 
Pulmonary edema, hepatic 
failure, alcoholism (1) 
Subdural bleeding, alcoholism 
(1) 
Hepatic failure, alcoholism (1) 
 
Alcohol intoxication, 
alcoholism (1) 
Bronco-pneumonia, 
benzodiazepine abuse (1) 
Multiple organ failure, 
personality disorder (1) 
Homicide, alcoholism (1) 
Breast cancer, alcoholism (1) 
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Appendix D: Corpus of Statements 
Appendix D.1: Key papers, chapters and handbooks 
Peter Dally and William Sargant’s A 
New Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa, 
published in 1960, and their follow-up 
paper in 1966, Treatment and 
outcome of anorexia nervosa. 
The earliest papers identified describing a re-
feeding treatment study within the NHS.  I have 
elaborated on the rationale for their inclusion and 
compiled an historical case narrative based on 
these two papers in section 3.1.1. 
Anorexia Nervosa a short book 
published by Dally in 1969. 
This monograph captures Dally’s developing 
conceptualisations of AN and re-feeding practices 
alongside the role of psychological treatments. 
Anorexia nervosa: Its identity as an 
illness and its treatment, a chapter 
written by Gerald Russell, published in 
1970. 
Russell was one of the earliest British psychiatrists 
interested in anorexia.  In this chapter, appearing in 
the second volume of Modern Trends in 
Psychological Medicine, Russell presented a 
summary of ideas and research relating to AN. 
A handbook compiled by Garfinkel 
and Garner (1982), Canadian 
psychiatrists, titled Anorexia Nervosa: 
a Multidimensional Perspective.  
This book provided a summary of research up until 
its publication and described a range of 
perspectives relating to the symptoms, theories of 
aetiology and treatment of AN. 
Handbook of eating disorders: Theory, 
treatment and research edited by 
George Szmukler, Christopher Dare  
and Janet Treasure and published in 
(1995)  
This handbook was edited by psychiatrists who had 
worked closely with Russell and the handbook“ 
aimed to provide an up-to-date review of the most 
“powerful ideas, hypotheses, or models which have 
dominated the field” of eating disorders (p. xvii) 
The second edition of the Handbook 
of Eating Disorders edited by Janet 
Treasure, Ulrike Schmidt and Eric van 
Furth and published in 2003. 
In this updated edition, the editors stated that this 
edition represented a shift to a European 
perspective on eating disorders.   
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Appendix D.2: Guidelines regarding the assessment, management and 
treatment of anorexia nervosa 
The revised fourth edition of 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders [DSM] published by 
the American Psychiatric Association 
in 2000. 
An authoritative nosology of ‘mental disorders’, 
which has guided research since the publication of 
the first edition in 1952.  A revised fifth edition is due 
for publication imminently 
Core interventions in the treatment 
and management of anorexia 
nervosa, bulimia nervosa and related 
eating disorders published by NICE in 
2004. 
The National Institute of Clinical Excellent compiled 
this evidence-based practice guideline in 
collaboration with the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
and the British Psychological Society.  . 
MARSIPAN: Management of Really 
Sick Patients with Anorexia Nervosa 
published by the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists and Royal College of 
Physicians in October 2010, and   
Junior MARSIPAN: Management of 
Really Sick Patients under 18 with 
Anorexia Nervosa published by the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists in 2012 
These guidelines were developed to reduce the 
variability in the quality of treatment practices of AN 
and in relation to concerns about unnecessary 
fatalities in general medical settings from tentative 
re-feeding practices.   I have provided a more 
detailed rationale for their inclusion and information 
about the guidelines in the case narrative of current 
practice in section 3.1.2. 
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Appendix E: Junior MARSIPAN Risk Assessment Framework 
Guidance 1 Risk assessment framework for young people with eating 
disorders40 
 
 Red (high risk) Amber (alert to high 
concern) 
Green (moderate 
risk)  
Blue (low risk) 
BMI and weight Percentage median 
BMI<70% (approx. 
below 0.4th BMI 
centile) 
Percentage median 
BMI 70–80% (approx. 
between 2nd and 0.4th 
BMI centile) 
Percentage median 
BMI 80–85% (approx. 
9th–2nd BMI centile) 
Percentage median 
BMI>85% (approx. 
above 9th BMI 
centile) 
 Recent loss of weight 
of 1 kg or more/week 
for 2 consecutive 
weeks 
Recent loss of weight 
of 500–999 g/week for 
2 consecutive weeks 
Recent weight loss of 
up to 500 g/week for 2 
consecutive weeks 
No weight loss over 
past 2 weeks 
Cardiovascular 
health 
Heart rate (awake)<40 
bpma 
Heart rate (awake) 
40–50 bpm 
Heart rate (awake) 
50–60 bpm 
Heart rate (awake) 
>60 bpm 
  Sitting blood pressure: 
systolic <0.4th 
centile(84–98 mmHg  
depending on age  
and genderb); diastolic 
<0.4th centile (35–40 
mmHg depending on 
age and gendera) 
Sitting blood pressure: 
systolic <2nd centile 
(98–105 mmHg 
dependingon age and 
gendera); diastolic 
<2nd centile(40–45 
mmHg depending on 
age and gendera) 
Normal sitting blood 
pressure for age 
and gender with 
reference to centile 
chartsa 
 History ofrecurrent 
syncope;marked 
orthostaticchanges (fall 
insystolic blood 
pressure of 20 mmHg 
or more,or below 
0.4th–2nd centiles for 
age, or increase in 
heart rate of>30 bpm) 
Occasionalsyncope; 
moderate orthostatic 
cardiovascular 
changes (fall in 
systolic blood pressure 
of 15 mmHg or more, 
or diastolic blood 
pressurefall of 10 
mmHgor more within3 
min standing,or 
increase inheart rate 
of up to30 bpm) 
Pre-syncopal 
symptoms but normal 
orthostatic 
cardiovascular 
changes 
 
Normal orthostatic 
cardiovascular 
changes 
 
 Irregular heartrhythm 
(doesnot include 
sinusarrhythmia) 
  Normal heartrhythm 
   Cool peripheries; 
prolonged peripheral 
capillary refill time 
(normalcentral 
capillaryrefill time) 
 
ECG abnormalities QTc>460 ms (girls)or 
400 ms (boys)with 
evidence 
ofbradyarrhythmiaor 
tachyarrhythmia 
(excludes sinus 
bradycardia and sinus 
arrhythmia);ECG 
evidenceof 
biochemicalabnormality 
QTc>460 ms (girls)or 
400 ms (boys) 
 
QTc<460 ms(girls) or 
400 ms(boys) and 
takingmedication 
known to prolong QTc 
interval,family history 
ofprolonged QTcor 
sensorineuraldeafness 
QTc<460 ms(girls) 
or 400 ms(boys) 
 
Hydration status Fluid refusal        
Severe dehydration 
(10%): reduced urine  
Severe fluid restriction 
Moderate dehydration 
(5–10%): reduced  
Fluid restriction Mild 
dehydration (<5%): 
may have dry mouth  
Not clinically 
dehydrated 
                                            
40
Reproduced from the Junior MARSIPAN guidelines (RCP, 2012, pp. 17-19). 
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 Red (high risk) Amber (alert to high 
concern) 
Green (moderate 
risk)  
Blue (low risk) 
Hydration status 
cont. 
output, dry mouth, 
decreased skin turgor, 
sunken eyes,  
tachypnoea, 
tachycardiac 
urine output, dry 
mouth, normal skin 
turgor, some 
tachypnoea, some 
tachycardia,cperipheral 
oedema 
or not clinically 
dehydrated but with 
concerns about risk of 
dehydration with 
negative fluid balance 
 
Temperature <35.5°C tympanic or 
35.0°C axillary 
<36°C    
Biochemical 
abnormalities 
Hypophosphataemia, 
hypokalaemia, 
hypoalbuminaemia, 
hypoglycaemia, 
hyponatraemia, 
hypocalcaemia 
Hypophosphataemia, 
hypokalaemia, 
hyponatraemia, 
hypocalcaemia 
  
Disordered eating 
behaviours 
Acute food refusal or 
estimated calorie 
intake 400–600 kcal 
per day 
Severe restriction (less 
than 50% of required 
intake), vomiting, 
purging with laxatives 
Moderate restriction, 
bingeing  
 
Engagement with 
management plan 
Violent when parents 
try to limit behaviour or 
encourage food/fluid 
intake, parental 
violence in relation to 
feeding (hitting, force 
feeding) 
Poor insight into eating 
problems, lacks 
motivation to tackle 
eating problems, 
resistance to changes 
required to gain 
weight, parents unable 
to implement meal 
plan advice given by 
healthcare providers 
Some insight into  
eating problems, some 
motivation to tackle 
eating problems, 
ambivalent towards 
changes required to 
gain weight but not 
actively resisting 
Some insight into 
eating problems, 
motivated to tackle 
eating problems, 
ambivalence 
towards changes 
required to gain 
weight not apparent 
in behaviour 
Activity and 
exercise 
High levels of 
uncontrolled exercise 
in the context of 
malnutrition (>2 h/day) 
Moderate levels of 
uncontrolled exercise 
in the context of 
malnutrition (>1 h/day) 
Mild levels of 
uncontrolled exercise 
in the context of 
malnutrition (<1 h/day) 
No uncontrolled 
exercise 
 
Self-harm and 
suicide 
Self-poisoning, suicidal 
ideas with moderate to 
high risk of completed 
suicide 
Cutting or similar 
behaviours, suicidal 
ideas with low risk of 
completed suicide 
  
Other mental health 
diagnoses 
 Other major  
psychiatric 
codiagnosis, e.g. 
OCD, psychosis, 
depression 
  
Muscular weakness 
– SUSS Test 
    
Sit up from lying flat Unable to sit up at all 
from lying flat (score 0) 
Unable to sit up 
without using upper 
limbs (score 1) 
Unable to sit up 
without noticeable 
difficulty (score 2) 
Sits up from lying 
flat without any 
difficulty (score 3) 
Stand up from squat Unable to get up at all 
from squatting (score 
0) 
Unable to get up 
without using upper 
limbs (score 1) 
Unable to get up 
without noticeable 
difficulty (score 2) 
Stands up from 
squat without any 
difficulty (score 3) 
Other Confusion and 
delirium, acute 
pancreatitis, gastric or 
oesophageal rupture 
Mallory–Weiss tear, 
gastrooesophageal 
reflux or gastritis, 
pressure sores 
Poor attention and 
concentration 
 
BMI, body mass index; bpm, beats per minute; ECG, electrocardiogram; OCD, obsessive–compulsive disorder; SUSS, Sit 
Up, Squat–Stand. 
a. Patients with inappropriately high heart rate for degree of underweight are at even higher risk (hypovolaemia). Heart 
rate 
may also be increased purposefully through the consumption of excess caffeine in coffee or other drinks. 
b. Jackson et al, 2007. 
c. Or inappropriate normal heart rate in an underweight young person. 
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ECG, electrocardiam 
                                            
41
 Reproduced from the Junior MARSIPAN guidelines (RCP, 2012, p. 47). 
 Starting intake should not be lower than intake before admission. For most young 
people starting at 20 kcal/kg/day or higher, such as 1000 kcal per day or 
quarter/half portions, appears to be safe. However, electrolytes and clinical state 
need careful monitoring and transfer to a paediatric unit may be required if, for 
example, phosphate falls to<0.4 mmol/l. 
 In the individuals who are at highest risk, and usually in paediatric rather than 
psychiatric settings, it may be necessary to use lower starting intakes (e.g. 5–10 
kcal/kg/day), especially in the presence of severity indicators such as ECG 
abnormalities or evidence of cardiac failure, electrolyte abnormalities before re-
feeding starts, active comorbidities (such as diabetes or infections), or very low 
initial weight. 
 If low initial calorie levels are used (5–10 kcal/kg/day), clinical and biochemical 
review should be carried out twice daily at first, with calories increasing in steps 
unless there is a contraindication, and continuing to increase until weight gain is 
achieved. Low-calorie feeding should be discussed with an expert in clinical 
nutrition and a nutrition support team. Minor or even moderate abnormalities of 
liver function should not delay increased feeding. 
 Re-feeding syndrome is most likely to occur in the first few days of re-feeding but 
may occur up to 2 weeks after. Biochemical monitoring should continue for a 
fortnight or until electrolyte parameters are stable. 
